The Arab revolutions are creating a new Middle East, whose picture will take a few years to become clear, because the consolidation of political structures that have resulted from the huge change underway in Arab societies require some time before they author policies that will form the new regional order. Once again, one should repeat the notion that change in the regional order is being made in the Middle East, and not in the theories of Americans about the Middle East. There have been surprises for Washington since the revolutions broke out, and over the last three months it has tended, along with Israel, to support dictatorships that have fallen, and feared the consequences of their departure. The White House of President Barack Obama, and the countries of the west, have belatedly coped with these revolutions, in an attempt to preserve its interests amid the change, that it cannot rein in or control. There is a huge popular momentum behind the revolutions, and by this belated adaptation, the United States is trying to limit the potential damage from the dominos of coming revolts. Isn't the declaration by Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi, for example, that his country was ready to be open to Iran as a pivotal state in the region, a sign of the repercussions of the domestic changes on the regional situation? Wasn't the decision by the Supreme Military Council to open the Rafah border and change its daily behavior on Palestine, compared to the policies of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, evidence of this? There have been steps of this type, in parallel with Cairo's commitment to the Camp David peace agreements. Don't they signal the beginning of Egypt's readying itself to recover its own pivotal role in the region's crises, contrary to the former regime's tying itself to the policies of the US? The earlier policy robbed Cairo of even having regional tools of pressure, maneuver and bargaining. Doesn't the openness of the new Egyptian regime to Syria after years of profound disputes, which weakened the Arab order regionally and internationally, represent a development in this regard? Perhaps a reading of these repercussions and of the virus of change is what prompted Syrian President Bashar Assad to say in his speech the other day that “the changes in our region are huge and significant and will have repercussions for the entire region, with no exception. This means that Syria is not isolated from what is happening. We are a part of this region and interact with it, influence it and are influenced by it. But at the same time, we are not a copy of the other countries around us; we have our specific features.” Although President Assad believes that survival without reform is “destructive,” his comment that Syria is “being subjected to a big conspiracy, by countries near and far away,” supported the “disappointment” at the delay in his taking rapid reform moves. In addition to the warning about the foreign conspiracy, there are incidents that indicate the Syrian regime enjoys a climate that is suitable to it on the external front, for realistic reasons compared to other regimes. The events of the past week saw a type of Arab embrace of Syria, through contacts expressing solidarity, made by the leaders of Gulf countries with President Assad. The events generated positive Turkish encouragement, based on the countries' friendly ties, toward reform, while leading Western countries, and especially the US, continue with traditional stances, which adopt a policy of changing the behavior of the regime in Syria, and not changing the regime. This belief has become even firmer in recent months. The Syrian leadership believes that it achieved a success in confronting the period of sanctions and pressure, since the American invasion of Iraq, and followed by the 2005 events in Lebanon, and the breaking of this isolation in 2008, with Western openness to Damascus. Likewise, it removes the argument that giving priority to confronting the pressures has made reform number two in importance. More than two and a half years has passed since this success. It is dangerous to head further into the theory of a foreign conspiracy, and be reassured by the Arab and regional embrace of Syria. Such moves obscure the reason for the need for reform in society. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, this core reason was fought back against the Arab and international embrace of bin Ali and Mubarak. It led to the disaster that is underway in Libya, where the Libyan regime has brought about foreign intervention due to its excessive resistance to change, on the pretext of outside parties being involved. The Syrian case is certainly different than all other countries. But this does not mean that lessons cannot be learned from the experiences of these countries. In Syria, focusing on the conspiracy theory leads to slowness, and not speed, in reform. This wastes the opportunity that is available, and harms the regime's pro-reform segment, compared to the other segment, which fights reform, and is sunk in corruption or in the obsolete forms of the past, which reject modernization. There is a truth that goes beyond special features, and it applies to Syria, just like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere. The attempt to develop economic structures does not succeed without reform of the political structures that block economic growth, and deriving benefit from it, should it take place.
