There is no longer a need for a major analysis in order to figure out that the path of the Libyan intifada is proceeding in an opposite direction to that of the Egyptian and Tunisian intifadas. This of course is unrelated to whether Muammar Gaddafi deserves to fall or not, as this issue has been settled a long time ago, ever since the Colonel took over power in Libya. This is rather related to the nature of the regimes in the three countries. This can apply, and also constitute a lesson, to the intifadas that others in the region are dreaming of. Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had preserved, or let's say failed to destroy, the cohesion of the [corrupted] ruling party and the ability of the military and security apparatuses to control the internal situation and to facilitate the work of the two autocratic regimes in the two countries. Thus, when the two presidents were overthrown, most individuals remained at their posts and the ruling institutions kept working. This resulted in that the two countries did not collapse or dismantle. That is why we were reluctant at an earlier time to describe the events of Tunisia and Egypt as being a revolution because they did not lead to the production of a new ruling class, nor did they lead to a new ruling system or to the deep social and economic changes that normally accompany revolutions. Of course, some cosmetic surgeries were and still are being done, the last of which was the change of the prime ministers in both countries. But let us ponder for a moment the identity of the major force that is currently holding the threads of the internal game in Tunisia and Egypt! Is there any doubt on that this same force was the one protecting the regimes, the rights, and the duties of Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali? In Libya, things are completely different. Had the failure of Gaddafi meant that only his regime will fall and that it will be replaced by a democratic regime, then it would have been possible to congratulate the Libyan people for their great achievement as they were able to terminate the old regime without having to face the repercussions and consequences. However, the fall of Gaddafi and his family in Libya will unfortunately not only lead to that alone, but also to the threat of destroying the entire Libyan state. Perhaps the “best” Gaddafi deed has been to destroy all the institutions that are capable of maintaining the state after the regime is changed. Libya has no bureaucratic apparatus that would guarantee the continuation of administrative work in the state. In addition, Gaddafi had purposefully dealt a blow to all the military and security apparatuses that countries revert to as the last resort in order to defend their existence. He turned them into militias and to so-called revolution committees. This has been expressed quite clearly through the events of the Eastern regions in Libya that were said to have been completely “liberated” from the authority of Gaddafi. In these areas, media reports indicate that the rebels tried to organize committees in order to bridge the security and administrative gap and to secure the simplest daily services such as traffic movement control and the protection of public facilities. Chaos was quite flagrant in those areas through the abduction of the members of the British security delegation, which comprised members of the private forces and the external intelligence apparatus. These were carrying out a mission in Benghazi consisting of communicating with the ruling group in Eastern Libya, most members of which belong to the team which, in the near past, was surrounding Gaddafi and holding posts in his regime. It is hard to have a democratic regime in any given state if there is no state to start with. Democracy cannot be born out of chaos but rather out of operational institutions. Thus, such an opportunity does present itself for Tunisia and Egypt in order to make this transition. But a question remains to be asked on whether the apparatus that is controlling the interim phase, i.e. the army in both cases, is persuaded of securing the necessary conditions for democratic work; in addition to whether the concerned parties and bodies are convinced and ready to accept the results, especially if these results do not serve their interests. Do the Arab and regional experiences around us allude to such arrangements?
