The ceiling of compromises that the regime in Egypt is prepared to offer to the demonstrators in Tahrir square has become known: no to the departure of Hosni Mubarak. No to a change in the regime's direction. No to ending the sit-in by force. However, the ceiling of the demonstrators' demands is fluctuating, based on the interest of each party in the opposition. The slogan “the people want to bring down the regime” continues to be raised in the public squares. However, “the regime” has come to mean several things for those gathered in downtown Cairo, although the word's meaning is extremely clear. There are those who believe that bringing down the regime means that President Mubarak must leave office. Others believe that bringing down the regime means bringing down Mubarak and along with him all of the figures of the former regime, including its appointed vice-president Omar Suleiman, and the new prime minister, Ahmad Shafiq. A third group goes further than this, as it calls for a change in the identity of the regime itself, i.e. its Western alliances and its relations with Israel. In fact, this is a call that is being wagered on by the “defiant” masses outside the Egyptian arena. They believe the battle for Tahrir square is their battle, more than an urgent concern of Egyptian young people and their political parties, in most of their various orientations. This is because few in Egypt today dream of returning to the time of Nasserist dreams, at a time when nothing remains of these dreams in the Arab arena except the fiery and opportunistic speeches of some governments and parties in the region, which rush to ride popular waves as long as these protests are taking place elsewhere. The Egyptian regime has succeeded in retaining its firm foundations, 14 days after the uprising began. These foundations include the military, political and media institutions, and security agencies. As for the reforms and changes that are supposed to take place within these institutions and agencies, they are taking place within the regime, meaning that the regime is supervising them and conducting them. Naturally, the regime is doing this to comply with the demonstrations and the masses. But the mere fact that it is the regime that is doing this, means that what we are seeing in Egypt is not a commonly-accepted type of “revolution.” Instead, it is a cosmetic move that will lead in the end to lengthening the lifespan of the regime, and not bringing it down. Protecting the Egyptian regime, in the first degree, is the fact that its institutions have rallied around it, or more precisely around its leading figure, namely Hosni Mubarak. In other, similar cases, it was easy to see the disintegration and instability of this support. There were many inducements for taking such a course, such as internal popular pressure, and foreign enticements, led by those offered by President Barack Obama during the early stages up the uprising, through calling for change “now.” This prompted some, and especially General Omar Suleiman, to pounce on the presidency. Meanwhile, as this governmental and military rallying-around the regime took place, the intifada in Tahrir square has become many intifadas, and the opposition has become oppositions. There were those prepared to negotiate about ways out of the crisis, while others were determined to remain in Tahrir square until the president leaves office. There was the pressure of the socio-economic situation, which forced some to return to their homes and jobs. Here, the regime was able to secure some compromises. Omar Suleiman was able to call for dialogue with the opposition groups (including the Muslim Brotherhood) under a photograph of Hosni Mubarak. The picture was very expressive: the vice-president sitting on a chair that was higher than those of others, and above him was the picture of his president, whose ouster was desired by the opposition groups prior to entering into any dialogue! Omar Suleiman and Ahmad Shafiq were thus able to secure from the opposition groups a condemnation of foreign intervention in Egyptian affairs, whether on the part of Western powers, which wanted to set the time-table for a transition of power, or from opportunistic regional powers, which wanted to exploit the Egyptian uprising and use it to serve their own objectives. In the end, the Egyptian uprising has taken on a new identity, which seems clear. It is much less than a revolution, and more than a reform movement. It is an uprising that is taking place under the ceiling of the regime, and is not attacking its policy orientations and commitments. As a result, it will be less frightening to others in the region and less responsive to the wishes of those who are conducting the uprising.
