The events in Tunisia and Egypt are creating great uncertainty. But they should be welcomed, as much as the other color revolutions of recent decades. Revolutions in history come in two types – radical revolutions and the newer ‘color' revolutions. Radical revolutions typically depend on mobilizing illiterate peasants and workers, based on class hatred, against a privileged elite. Such revolutions promulgate an ideology of radical social change to overturn the social order and do away with the privileged. This was the pattern in the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, and the Iranian Revolution. The new ‘color' revolutions, by contrast, typically depend on mobilizing skilled workers, professional and middle classes, and students; they lack a radical ideology, instead aspiring to replace a hated ruler or decrepit ruling party with liberal democratic norms. This was the pattern in Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, the Philippines, and Georgia. So far, events in Tunisia and Egypt fit the profile of color revolutions. Radical groups are absent or marginal to events; instead the people are revolting against decades of oppression by corrupt leaders who increasingly sought to turn their countries into family fiefs. As in the other color revolutions, these counties seem headed for what may be messy and contested democracies, but not toward radical, authoritarian regimes. Yet one must be cautious – the radicals were not always dominant from the start even in the radical revolutions. In Iran, France, and Russia, the radicals only came to power by overthrowing the more moderate regimes which first appeared following the fall of the Shah, King and Tsar. What gave the radicals their chance was fears of counter-revolution. The power-vacuum that follows revolutions provides an opportunity for different groups to compete for popular support. If the people feel threatened, they gravitate toward the groups that are most outspoken in their defense of the revolution, creating openings for organized radical groups to take over the revolutions and drive them to extremes. Mohamed El Baradei may yet play the role that Vaclav Havel played in Czechoslovakia, consolidating a ‘velvet' revolution – or he could play the role of Alexander Kerensky, the exiled lawyer in Russia who became the first Prime Minister after the fall of the Tsar and leader of the moderate Kadet government, but who a few months later was shoved aside by the radical Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky. What will govern whether Egypt and Tunisia stay on the track of ‘color revolutions,' or veer off toward radicalism, is whether the new regimes feel threatened by external and internal enemies. Western leaders thus need to be vigorous in reassuring any new regimes that emerge in these nations that they face no threat. Even if Islamists are involved in the new governments – as they likely will be – the U.S. and western governments need to avoid reacting with suspicion or fear, as that will only fuel paranoia and strengthen the appeal of extremists. Western allies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco will likely view the new regimes with suspicion and ask the U.S. and Europe to remain cool to regimes that overthrew rulers like themselves. Yet that impulse must be resisted; indeed authoritarian rulers throughout the Mideast should be cautioned to open their societies rather than risk being overthrown themselves. After the color revolutions in the Philippines, Eastern Europe, and Georgia, western powers rushed in with recognition, support, and embrace of struggling new democracies. They need to do the same without delay in Tunisia and Egypt. Not doing so risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of radicalization that is wholly unnecessary. * Jack Goldstone is the director of the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University in Virginia.
