Amazing are the events that took place in Egypt when the revolution of the masses erupted – inspired or not – by the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia – bringing Egyptians of different social classes, competencies and generations to say that the Egyptian people wants to regain its status as a leader of the Arab peoples. This in itself represents a historical awakening in the course taken by Egypt at the local and regional levels, if the protests continue and their spirit spreads in the Arab region. Today, what should be closely monitored inside Egypt includes the following: first, whether the army will decide to be the state's army in partnership with the popular uprising or to be the state's army in partnership with the regime. This will depend on the army's assessment of domestic and foreign roles, ranging from the possibility of the Muslim Brotherhood hijacking the youth revolution, to that of large and small states in the region playing their regional cards and interfering in Egypt's affairs because they want to redesign a new regional order. Indeed, if the army reaches the conviction that Iran, Qatar or Israel is exploiting the uproar of the masses to redefine the regional order, it will be very careful and take its time before allying itself with the people against the regime. On the other hand, if the youth revolution refuses to allow foreign parties or powerful domestic Islamist organizations to hijack its revolution, then the Egyptian army could reach a qualitative transformation point, where it would become the state's army, not the regime's army, thereby allying itself with the new generation that wants reform, jobs and education, not military rule or Islamic rule. Second, what should be monitored on the long term is how opposition leaders in Egypt strengthen relations amongst themselves. Indeed, reason dictates that there is no way for the temporary union between the Arab left and the Arab religious movement to be maintained, because they are opposites that have united for a purpose, not for a permanent goal. And if it is inevitable for them to separate in the wake of the shared purpose being achieved (toppling the regime or aborting plans of inheriting power), which side will benefit most from such a separation? Logically, it should be the youth that benefits, as well as the generations of moderation that preceded them, because they stand together against military extremism or religious extremism and the rule of both. Third, with the revolution spreading to different parts of the Arab World, it is necessary to carefully consider the model that might style itself the alternative in the Arab region, as well as the “preemptive” measures taken by leaders and rulers in countries of the region, measures for which it is perhaps far too late. The question raised here is: if it is the Turkish model – army and state – that is sought after by the Arabs, what will then happen to the Iranian model – religious autocracy – and the desire of the rulers and mullahs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to export their revolution? In other words, there is today a de facto race taking place between the Turkish and Iranian models on the Arab scene. The surprise may lie in the ability of the Arab youth to shape to an Arab model that no one today expects. This would require tremendous awareness by the youth, at the political, social and economic levels. It would require the youth's wonderful visionary dimension, not merely the amazing surprise they bring. The first thing the youth should realize and insist upon is not allowing anyone to hijack their achievements or take away their dreams and the vision of the future for which they carried out their uprising. This will require a profound understanding of the impact choices made today will have on the ambitions of tomorrow. Indeed, the road will be bumpy and very dangerous, because the youth has an overwhelming desire for change, great pride in the ability to communicate through the internet, and overwhelming trust in what will come after the change. However, political skill, experience of leadership, and patience mixed with resolve are the characteristics of political parties that have a long experience, characteristics which the youth is unfamiliar with. The fear is from traditional formations that seek after power consuming the aspirations and ambitions of the youth, which seeks after change not for the sake of power, but rather for the sake of good governance, reform and the future of the Arabs. The wisdom of the youth revolution in Egypt is that it has not been – at least at its start – haphazard, vengeful, ideological, Islamic or doctrinal. It has been much more of an ebullition than a revolution. The army respected it and it respected the army. They both sought partnership for the sake of the nation and the state. They both sought after change at the top of the hierarchy in power. The army sought gradual change, and the people disagreed over the rhythm at which President Hosni Mubarak should step down and relinquish power. There was nearly the recognition among the majority – both the people and the army – that Hosni Mubarak had served Egypt, and that humiliating him as a President would entail humiliation for Egypt itself, even if there was consensus over the fact that he must relinquish power. There was near consensus over the fact that the youth revolution has achieved a great deal within the space of a week, because it aborted first the maintaining of Mubarak's rule beyond his current term in office, and second the idea of inheriting power. Thus the youth revolution has overthrown the concept of inheritance regardless of how divided it has been over Gamal Mubarak's qualifications. Hosni Mubarak has done everything he should have done, but he has done it too late. He drove himself into a corner because he took too long to understand people, to speak to them, and to explain to them what was on his mind. He has thereby committed grave mistakes and stubbornly clung to them. He is the victim of the complex of “power” and of the complex of “the elite” equally, after he had in the early years of his rule been very good at talking to people in their own language. Hosni Mubarak has today become the “stubborn” man who refuses to listen and who puts his country and himself at risk because his definition of dignity and pride is old-fashioned and not in tune with the language of today. Indeed, if he was worried about the fate and the future of Egypt because of foreign interference or domestic exploitation, had he only decided to speak in the language of today, not the language of yesterday which the youth does not understand. But he did not. He decided to fall while standing tall, and pledged that he would not share the fate of toppled Tunisian President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, the Shah of Iran, or Romania's toppled ruler Ceauşescu. Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh has begun to feel that the Jasmine Revolution is headed his way. That is why he has taken measures signifying that he has abandoned the idea of his son inheriting power and that he will remain in power only until the end of his term in office. Had he done this before the spread of the revolution in the Arab region, he would have been saved. But now such pledges by Arab leaders will not be sufficient. Indeed, what this requires are radical reforms of the type of constitutional amendments that follow the dissolution of governments and parliaments, with new laws being enacted that guarantee everyone's participation and provide strict guarantees of alternation, or else what the Arab region will come to will be mere refusals to step down and to relinquish power. Moreover, Islamist formations threaten the democratic process more than any other parties, because they want to impose a constitution and laws that guarantee that they will hold power without allowing for any change. And certainly, haphazard change in Yemen would be dangerous, because the country holds those who are preparing to take power – even through chaos – because they have the greatest ability to take hold of Yemen as a country and as a launching base, and that is the Al-Qaeda network. Indeed, a revolution in Yemen must be more cautious than in other countries because it would be exposed to being a stepping stone for dragging Yemen into what is worse. The responsibility of guaranteeing that Yemen will not slip into chaos and turn into fertile soil for terrorism and collapse, as well as for exporting both, is responsibility shared between the people, the army, the regime and the immediate neighborhood. Iran would certainly benefit from such change, as it is benefiting from the change that is toppling the regime in Egypt. Lebanon's Hezbollah too is at ease at such change for several reasons – including the tense and antagonistic relationship it has had with Egypt in recent times. Hamas as well finds benefit in such change, although Egypt's mediation led by current Vice President and former Director of Intelligence Omar Suleiman has helped Hamas repeatedly. The leadership in Syria feels safe from the youth revolution or the Jasmine Revolution, because it has prevented the internet from developing in the country and now has the ability to nip any such revolution in the bud. The same applies to Libya, where repression of the internet youth rivals the repression of Syria's youth. This is why the two leaderships feel at ease and trust that the winds of the revolution are not heading their way. It is not clear what the different players – local, regional and international – have in mind in terms of making use of the youth revolution in the Arab region. Clearly the youth must realize and be ready for what is being prepared by seasoned organizations and political parties that seek, at the end of the day, to reach power. Youths must carefully examine their regional environment in order to realize who plays what roles for whose benefit. Indeed, this is their revolution, with its own characteristics and goals that distinguish it from the revolutions of their predecessors. The biggest challenge for them will be to defend it in its prime from seasoned politicians and from those who would climb upon it.
