The Istanbul meetings between Iran and the P5+1 nations have failed, at a time when no one ever expected them to succeed. They ended without a result worth mentioning and without even an agreement over a new date for the resumption of the talks, as it was expressed by European Union Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton who announced that there was no decision to stage a new round of negotiations. In other words, a year or more could go by, as it happened before the Vienna meeting, which was held more than a year after complete suspension and which was decided to be resumed in Turkey. Iran paved the way before the Istanbul meetings with a propaganda campaign in which it called on the accredited ambassadors in Tehran to visit its nuclear sites and confirm the peaceful inclinations of its program. However, the major states did not heed the invitation and transferred this mission to the inspection commission affiliated with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Tehran gave way too much importance to the announcement made by American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the Manama Dialogue forum at the end of last year, when she said that Iran could enrich uranium “provided it reassures the international community” about the safety of its nuclear program. Consequently, the Iranian negotiating delegation came to Istanbul with one main condition, i.e. that the talks do not tackle the discontinuation of the enrichment activities. As for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he was clear as he has previously been on many occasions, and threatened the major states of hastening the nuclear program if they continued to threaten with sanctions – or more of them – indicating that all the previous sanctions had no negative impact on his country. He then reiterated the calls to these states to seek understandings or cooperation over the international and regional issues, i.e. to look into the lifting of the blockade imposed on his country and the recognition of its role as a major state with security, military and economic interests throughout the “Great Middle East.” In other words, Iran's say should equal those of the major states at the level of the issues of this vital region, just as it probably used to be the case between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and as it is today between the United States and Russia, China and other major powers. Therefore, Iranian negotiator Ali Asghar Soltanieh did not hesitate to caution the representatives of the six nations that the Istanbul meeting will constitute the last opportunity. This is due to the fact that if the Islamic Republic acquires the “yellow cake” which provides it with self-sufficiency at the level of the materials used in nuclear fuel and if it no longer needs highly-enriched nuclear fuel from abroad, then the deal it concluded with Turkey and Brazil on the eve of the Security Council's ratification of the fourth package of sanctions will no longer be needed – unless the major powers accept the revival of the agreement allowing Tehran to get more highly-enriched uranium and its reactors to produce medical isotopes! There is no arguing about the fact that the six powers were not prepared to offer such a free “gift” after all the developments that occurred at the level of the Iranian nuclear file and following all the progress at the level of the enrichment activities. Their representatives thus came to Istanbul while insisting on the necessity of discontinuing, or at least freezing the enrichment, in the hope of returning to the package of economic and political incentives they offered to Tehran in 2008. But does the failure of the talks and the absence of any agreement mean they constituted the last opportunity? Foreign Policy Chief Ashton announced that the door was still open, while Abol Fazl Zohrevand, the assistant of Iranian top negotiator Saeed Jalili, assured that other talks will be held “but we have not yet agreed on their timing and location.” This means that the six nations are still acting as though there was plenty of time to proceed with the diplomatic track in an attempt to find a solution for the Iranian nuclear file, and that the war option was still distant. In the meantime, the American administration believes that the diplomatic approach toward the Iranian nuclear file remains much less costly than the military option, and that there is plenty of time before Iran produces its nuclear bomb. In the context, the New York Times carried a report saying that the United States and Israel were behind the Stuxnet virus that attacked the Iranian nuclear facilities, and which prompted Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Moshe Ya'alon to state – a while ago – that Iran's acquisition of the nuclear bomb will require three years. In other words, Washington believes that the viruses war, the thousands of cyber attacks against Iranian centrifuges, and the pursuit of the Iranian nuclear scientists have delayed and will delay the acquisition of the nuclear bomb. The United States also believes that the increase of the international and unilateral sanctions, their negative economic and social repercussions, the security problems, the explosions witnessed every now and then, the impact of the decisions of President Ahmadinejad's government to cut the energy and food subsidies and the continuation of the domestic opposition of the reformists who keep recalling the illegitimacy of the regime following the presidential elections staged about a year and a half ago, are all elements which are bound to generate social repercussions which the regime will no longer be able to disregard or ignore. Moreover, they will weaken this regime's ability to continue providing financial support to its allies in the region, from Gaza to Lebanon and other places, and might force the command of the Republic to reconsider its positions and return to the negotiations table. This means that Washington does not see anything which might prevent the repetition of the experience of the Soviet Union that failed in the militarization race due to economic factors among others. And consequently, it is still wagering on time. However, the facts detected by Iran on the ground reveal the opposite. The Green Movement which rose in protest against the results of the presidential elections staged in June 2009 is almost a thing of the past. As for the economic decisions of President Ahmadinejad, they have so far failed to herald any popular uprising, while the strict sanctions did not leave any repercussions allowing the expectation of the worst. This has allowed and is still allowing Tehran to proceed with its foreign policy and continue supporting its positions and its allies outside the border, both in the East and the West. It is thus acting as though it possesses enough cards qualifying it to sit and negotiate from a position of power, while although it does not yet possess its nuclear bomb, its arsenal of traditional weapons – and especially its missiles arsenal – constitutes a major weight in the regional balance of powers. Iran is acting on the beat of the retreats and plights faced by President Barack Obama's administration at the level of all the issues in the region. Indeed, the Palestinian-Israeli settlement has failed to exit the predicament in which it was introduced by Benjamin Netanyahu, while Ehud Barak's departure from the Labor Party after keeping the Defense Ministry in the government, enhanced the position of the Likud leader in the face of Washington's policy. In the meantime, the return of violence in Iraq has allowed once again the questioning of Washington's position and the possible reconsideration of another pullout for its troops from this country at the end of the year, while it would be useless to recall the troubles faced by the NATO plans in Afghanistan and the threats facing Yemen. As for the latest development, it is that which was witnessed in Tunisia following the toppling of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's rule, knowing that - for years - the country constituted an important North African base for America and Europe at the level of the fight against “terrorism and the fundamentalist tide,” as well as a strong back-up for the peace settlement in the Middle East. And while the situation in Tunisia is witnessing a confrontation that is open to all possibilities and surprises, the ongoing battle over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is opening another front whose repercussions cannot be predicted. But if Washington has exerted pressures to prolong the July 2006 war in the hope of toppling Hezbollah without its goal and Israel's being achieved, and if it seemed incapable of preventing Hezbollah from controlling Beirut within hours in May 2008, can it influence the drastic transformation which is currently seen in Lebanon and is affecting the traditions of the system and not just the rule following the toppling of Prime Minister Saad Eddin al-Hariri's government? What Lebanon is witnessing heralds the full transformation of the political equation and the ruling structure in favor of Syria and Iran, accompanied by change affecting the alliances and alignments between the major regional powers, i.e. Syria, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, unless the tribunal were to surprise the conflicting sides in Beirut –both the local and the foreign ones – in a way they will not be able to tolerate or extinguish. In light of this situation, why would the negotiators over the Iranian file rush to sign a comprehensive deal whose elements are not yet ripe? Where is Ankara's role? Why did it settle for standing by and observing what is happening in Istanbul and what happened in Beirut before that?
