The resignation of ministers from Hezbollah and parties allied to it from the Lebanese government has confirmed that concordance between Syria and Iran remains absolute in the land of the cedars, and that all of the efforts exerted by Arab and Western countries to break such concordance have ended in failure. At the direct political level, in light of the inability so far to turn the tables on everyone or the lack of a desire to do so, obstructing state institutions remains the way to give shape to such concordance in the strategy adopted towards Lebanon – and this includes resigning from the government. This resignation has its own story in Lebanon. Indeed, it does not mean, like in any other country, leaving the government, turning into an opposition movement, and seeking to topple the government from without through elections. To resign in Lebanon means to obstruct the government and cling to ministerial posts – in other words to remain in power even after resigning. This is what happened to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government: obstruction, resignation and besieging government headquarters – and yet the ministers who had resigned continued to be present at their ministries, following up on the issues of interest to them, and receiving their ministerial salaries. And if resigning from Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government was aimed at forcing him to adopt the opposition's demands, it was at the same time aimed at imposing those demands on the forthcoming government cabinet, which will not be easy to form, by virtue of the distribution of forces in Parliament and their disagreement over these demands. Lebanon thus faces a long-term crisis, at the political, social and sectarian levels. And even if Hezbollah manages to gather a majority in Parliament to impose a Prime Minister from among its allies by way of the binding consultations that start tomorrow, the crisis will not be less severe. In fact, it will be even more dangerous, since the one targeted by such a process would be the leader of the Sunnis in Lebanon. The predicament in Lebanon is thus complete: Hariri and the forces allied with him cannot declare renouncing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), while Hezbollah and its allies cannot accept such a tribunal – knowing that the official Lebanese position, as per the decisions of the National Dialogue Table conference and ministerial statements, is in support of the STL. Presumably emerging from such a predicament would thus have to take place by changing this official position from within state institutions, which has not been successful so far from within political frameworks. That is why the ministers resigned, in hopes of causing such a change through the forthcoming government. Yet even if Hezbollah manages to attract enough MPs from Walid Jumblatt's parliamentary bloc to ensure a majority, the goal of annulling the STL would remain out of reach, in view of its nature and of the international and Arab forces supporting it. All that an official Lebanese formula to annul the tribunal could lead to is the eruption of sectarian confrontation and civil strife between Sunnis and Shiites, a conflict which it will not be easy to overcome in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Hezbollah will not have the ability to manage such a conflict, in light of the current internal balance of power. It would have to, as many of its officials have threatened, resort to an internal military settlement, which would necessarily result in restructuring power in Lebanon, and take hold of all of the country's state institutions, in such a way so as not to be threatened by any future elections or by any change in the general mood. Did Hezbollah not declare that it had been forced to use its weapons on May 7 in self-defense? But the result of this had been the Doha Agreement, which had deprived it of the right to obstruct the government – a right it has exercised, as he have seen, in order to annul the STL, failing to commit to the clause preventing it from resigning or from threatening to use force. That is the core of Syrian-Iranian concordance towards Lebanon: its stability should follow Syria and Iran's patterns, by completely taking hold of power and by assuming overwhelming popular support for such a takeover. It is that core which has led to the failure of Syrian-Saudi efforts, as it considered that what was required of Hariri and his allies was to relinquish the STL, as the deal's only clause, and completely ignored the part concerning the nature of power and the relationship with state institutions.
