New York-It seems that this is a phase of bringing oneself out of the corner into which many international and regional players have backed themselves, and yet there are exceptions. The tactic of coming out of the corner does not automatically mean that there is necessarily a new strategy, as it is in fact more likely that the purpose for changing tactics is to protect the strategy. Thus Israel has announced its resolve to withdraw from the Northern part of the village of Ghajar for tactical reasons not limited to its relationship with Lebanon, but rather essentially based on its bilateral relations with the United States, which have reached a dead-end and have resulted in the Israeli government backing itself into a corner. However, the broader Israeli policy concerning Palestine, Lebanon, Syria or Iran remains based on its customary strategy, regardless of the importance of the tactical measure of withdrawing from Ghajar. As for the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has backed itself into several corners by thrusting itself into additional enmities, aside from that towards the “American enemy”, reaching Russia, Nigeria and even China. Yet Tehran has recently shown willingness to return to negotiations with the five major countries holding permanent membership in the Security Council in addition to Germany over the nuclear issue. It also appears to be part of the international, regional and local agreement over the formation of the Iraqi government cabinet. In spite of this, there are no indications of radical change in the established Iranian strategy, in both its nuclear aspect and that of seeking after regional hegemony. Syria is always skilled at the tactic of removing itself from the corner into which it had previously backed itself, inadvertently or by making strategic mistakes. It is also equally skilled at formulating strategies that implicate others, so that they may move according to steps designed for them by Damascus, especially Lebanese players, from among the ranks of the opposition and the loyalists alike. Hezbollah is traditionally expert at political skill, but it has more recently been behaving as if it has lost both its temper and its political compass, backing itself into the corner of escalation and self-condemnation, as if it had been lured in and implicated without realizing it. The Palestinians have an exceptional ability at backing themselves into corners, especially amidst their dangerous divisions and the measures taken by some of them that fall as ammunition in the hands of Israel and come at a high cost for the Palestinian people. Yet regional players are not alone in backing themselves into corners, as in fact the Barack Obama Administration has proved its tremendous ability to display such “talent”, after having been preceded to this by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Indeed, the latter seems insistent on adopting the tactic as a strategy and saves, for instance, dictates coming out of Arab capitals and opposed by leaders in his government. That is why he excessively backs himself into corners, without neither a strategy nor a tactic for bringing himself, or France's Middle Eastern policy, out of them, however mistaken or costly they might be. The policies of Turkey under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu are perhaps the most strategic, as well as the most practical. Indeed, that regime is getting closer to overthrowing Turkey's autocratic secularism and replacing it with Turkey's special brand of Islamism, and it is doing this at a calculated pace, with local, regional and international dimensions reaching up to China. The Turkish government has wagered on the Obama Administration, making use of what had been leaked about its weakness in Ankara's favor. It has addressed Europe, not begging to be accepted as a member of the European Union, but rather with renewed confidence, suggesting that when hoping turned into begging (in European thoughts and minds), Turkey's pride rebelled against the whole idea. Instead of West, Turkey turned East to China, developing relations to such a degree that unprecedented joint military maneuvers were conducted last month and that the bilateral partnership was officially announced to be developed into a “strategic partnership”. This is while Turkey remains a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and while joint military maneuvers were in the past conducted with the United States and Israel. Yet what is important is that Ankara has not completely severed its ties with Israel, and that it remains a strategic partner for the United States within NATO. Turkey today excels at clinging to threads, including those extending to Iran, even when it is said that Turkey seeks after leadership of the Sunnis while Iran is in a position to lead the Shiites. Unlike Turkey, which today does not seem to need a strategy for bringing itself out of a “squeezed position”, the Islamic republic of Iran seems to be in a state of tension and division, behaving with arrogance, antagonizing and provoking others, and excessively backing itself into many corners. While Turkey appears prestigious and dignified (regardless of whether its policies are the object of criticism or dispute), Iran seems to have lost its dignity and to now be fighting its own shadow. The United States also seems to have lost its dignity, for several reasons. The Obama Administration today seems hard at work trying to bring itself out of the corner – the corner of confusion, the corner of reduced standing and the corner of mistaken policies that seem to bear the features of oversimplification. And because it is a superpower, the moment the United States makes a move, even if it comes late, everyone takes note of it and takes it into consideration in one form or another. Certainly Israel's decision to withdraw from Ghajar has come with a contribution from the US, after the Obama Administration made a move with regard to Lebanon in the past few weeks, having previously relied on miscalculations and then realized, awoke to and decided to address Lebanon's neighbors clearly and assertively. The importance of the Israeli withdrawal from the village of Ghajar is that it cancels out the logic of continued Israeli occupation of Lebanese territories from the point of view of the United Nations and the United States. Indeed, the Shebaa Farms, which are occupied by Israel, are from the point of view of the UN Syrian and not Lebanese territory, as long as Syria and Israel refuse to hand in the documents requested by the United Nations, which would verify whether the Shebaa Farms truly are Lebanese or Syrian territory. Damascus says that the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese, but it refuses to hand in the documents requested by the UN, saying that the fate of this territory, like the demarcation of the borders between Syria and Lebanon, must wait until after the Syrian Golan Heights have been liberated from Israeli occupation. As for Hezbollah, it considers Israeli occupation of both the village of Ghajar and the Shebaa Farms to be the main basis for resistance from Lebanese soil and the main justification for it to continue holding its weapons apart from the weapons held by the Lebanese state. The Obama Administration has of late adopted a strategy different from that previously implemented towards Lebanon, after having becoming frightened by recent developments there, which included the increased supply of weapons to Hezbollah from Syria, as well as Syria harboring Hezbollah arsenals – as US officials accuse it of. It has also been frightened as a result of the threats to undermine stability voiced by Hezbollah if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to try those involved in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his 22 companions were to issue an indictment against members of Hezbollah. US officials in charge of this issue refuse to reveal the options they have in store, and it is clear that clinging to the STL is not an exclusively American stance, but also a Russian one to the same extent as it is a British or a French one. Indeed, the decision has been taken not to allow Hezbollah or Syria to undermine the STL and to thwart their efforts to have it annulled. Thus the public escalation has led to the opposite result. Instead of weakening the STL or delaying its proceedings (including indictments), Syria's campaign, as well as that of Hezbollah, has led to gathering international consensus in support of the STL (including, for instance, Turkey), and General Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare has become more confident after having been subjected to pressures, most prominently from France and Gulf countries, which sought to water down the STL and to back down on indictments. Now those who have escalated and threatened have the choice either to implement their threats or to quiet down. It is alright to think of bringing oneself out of the corner, especially if it appears that therein resides perhaps implication or miscalculations. It is alright to climb down the ladder of escalation, especially if it means realizing the importance of anticipating the meaning of condemning oneself, instead of leaving the task of clearing one's name – or of failing to prove the conviction – to judiciary proceedings. Thus bringing oneself out of the corner acquires goals and meaningful justifications, especially if these are under the banner of giving priority to the stability of Lebanon and of the region. Today, it is the task of all the Lebanese, as well as of regional and international players, to return the situation to normal. There is no need to contribute to backing into a corner. What is required is group thinking into how to restore Hezbollah to its natural place and to its necessary position in the march of Lebanon's development and in the future of the region. The Obama Administration is presently thinking of new criteria for its policy towards the Middle East. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has, as it seems, taken control of the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, after Special Envoy Senator George Mitchell spent two years managing this issue to no avail. Perhaps he made a tactical mistake and failed to contain Israel's ability to maneuver and to impose its own agenda. And perhaps he failed in spite of everything he invested in terms of his capabilities and good intentions. What is important is that Hillary Clinton comes today to the issues of the Middle East with great challenges for herself and for others. Hillary Clinton is skilled at the language of the political game, but she might not be proficient in the language of negotiations. She comes to the Palestinian-Israeli issue with experiences that include that of her husband, former President Bill Clinton, who is an expert on the details of the issue as well as on the details of the art of negotiation. What her negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have led to in what is now known in New York as the “seven hours” involves a risk for the Obama Administration as well as for Hillary Clinton herself. The deal is of course incomplete, and it reveals the weakness of the United States. In fact, the 90 days period will be more of a test for the Obama Administration than it will be for Netanyahu's government. Such a period – the 90 days – provides the space for all of those who wish to bring themselves out of corners. Yet what is required is for this to be a provisional tactic, and for its outcome to be strategies more lucid than those that have emerged since Barack Obama arrived at the White House.