It is becoming clear that the features of the coming political battle in the region will be over the ideas that may be put forth by US President Barack Obama in his speech, scheduled for the beginning of next month in Egypt. Such ideas will deal with his point of view on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to the Iranian issue, in both its nuclear and political aspects. It is also becoming clear that the battle will not be restricted to the content of those ideas, but will also tackle the meaning of US interference in itself in the issue of the conflict, and what such interference represents in the regional balance of power between the Arabs and Israel on the one hand, and between the Arabs themselves on the other. It is in this sense that the swift visit made by US Vice President Joe Biden to Beirut two days ago was viewed, as the situation in Lebanon sums up to a great extent the balance of power. Indeed, on the one hand it is a country of confrontation with Israel, in which is active an armed resistance movement with ties to a regional depth opposed to US policy; on the other, it is a country that officially adopts the Arab Peace Initiative as a solution to the conflict, one that is also home to Western-leaning forces that give the priority to a peaceful diplomatic solution with Israel. Lebanon is also home to a large number of Palestinian refugees, whose fate will be contingent on the direction such the solution will finally take, in light of Lebanon's constitutional “refusal” to naturalize them. The situation in Lebanon also sums up the features of the next regional political battle, and the parliamentary elections in two weeks represent the juncture the country may be heading to. Thus one can say that the situation that will result from these elections, and what will come after them, will be an object of extreme interest to the Americans, who seek to promote their plan for the region, and those who oppose such a plan. This will lead the country to once again turn into a focal point for the conflict in the region, or in fact the battle will turn into a conflict over Lebanon. It is within such a framework that one can understand Biden's statements in Beirut about continued US aid to the army (and the state) being contingent on the results of these elections. The US Administration seeks to make use of any aid to Lebanon in its policies. However, the next Lebanese government on the other hand, whatever the results of the elections, will have to avoid making the country pay the price of this conflict, the intensity of which will increase as Iran's supposed deadline over the issue of its nuclear program draws near. Indeed, there is clearly a link in the expected US initiative – even if its features have not yet taken shape – between resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Lebanon will not be able to bear the burden of the US initiative if it includes naturalizing the Palestinians in any shape or form, and if all the Lebanese demands from Israel are not met and the truce agreement abided by before any settlement. Nor will it be able to bear turning into the only arena for opposing such an initiative. Indeed, in both cases, it will face the possibilities of rising tension and perhaps of sliding into violence, knowing that the confrontation, as it seems from electoral campaigns, finds its prelude in the electoral campaigns themselves and in verbal escalation over the nature of the system and its institutions. And it is not to cause alarm to conclude that brittle civil peace in Lebanon will face a difficult test in light of the conflict raging over the country and around it.
