Regardless of how ruthless the campaign of the Iraqi List headed by Iyad al-Allawi against outgoing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may be, it remains mild in comparison with the physical liquidation attempts such as the one which targeted UN Representative Ad Melkert and the one which previously targeted Allawi and was placed in the context of a “foreign conspiracy” to strike the efforts to bring Iraq back to the Arab lap. The leader of the Iraqi List probably still believes that Al-Maliki's insistence on “monopolizing” the premiership is a mere insistence on Allawi's political liquidation, which some abroad wish to use as a tool to complete the Iranian influence's occlusion over the decision-making circles in Baghdad. From Cairo, Al-Maliki is sending optimistic signals regarding the imminent end of the government formation crisis after seven months of altercations, a surprising turn of events - since Allawi seemed on the threshold of being assigned to form the government – and following the staging of honest elections and long weeks of disputes. In Turkey, the leader of the State of Law Coalition will reiterate his optimism, which the coming days will probably reveal was a mere wish obstructed by the conflict of roles still seen on the Iraqi arena. However, this conflict is no longer an American-Iranian one solely, considering that it intersected with the hopes of influential capitals in the region not to allow Tehran to monopolize the vacuum-filling process in the Land of the Two Rivers following the American pullout. In reality, the Arabs have overcome the stage of rejecting the prevalence of the Iranian influence in Iraq and are now attempting to establish a difficult balance which will certainly not be secured by Al-Maliki, who is considered by Tehran as being “the best choice.” These words are the very thing that differentiates between the “vision” of the Islamic Republic in Iran which is accused of imposing tutelage over the Iraqi political decision – since before the announcement of “victory” from Baghdad by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad – and the diplomacy of the other concerned capitals in the neighboring states. Indeed, the vocabulary of the latter is identical, especially in terms of the exclusion of any term which might affect the customary dealings between autonomous states. Indeed, Cairo, Riyadh, Ankara and even Damascus all recommend the non-exclusion of any party in Iraq and the establishment of partnership in a government that does not marginalize anyone. As for the person who should head this government, the foreign sides should abstain from supporting any figure at the expense of the others. Only Iran is monopolizing the selection of the “best” from the platform of the one who proclaimed “victory” and who was rid from what he considered as being “the evils of Saddam” by the Americans. Now, Guide Ali al-Khamenei is hoping that the Iraqis will “get rid of America's evils.” If every Iranian step is “good” and every American step is “evil,” one may wonder about the “silent” agreements between Tehran and Washington… if not about the intertwinement of the conflicting roles and interests on the Iraqi arena and the way Khamenei responds to each American gesture with additional threats against “the enemies”! Clearly, the Iraqi government formation battle cannot be isolated from the conflict of the American, Iranian, Turkish and Arab wills, and if its repercussions were to further extend the tunnel, they will open up vacuum to additional rounds of killings… In the meantime, in light of the sectarian tensions prevailing over the region, the gunpowder barrel in the Land of the Two Rivers could launch its sparks in all directions. This is exactly the reason behind Cairo's and Riyadh's concerns and why they are recommending a partnership government in Baghdad, hoping it would spare Iraq and the region from sectarian strife. However, as long as the Iraqi List has not yet changed its mind regarding Al-Maliki's stay at the head of the government, as long as Al-Maliki has not relinquished his ambitions as it is being revealed by his regional tour and as long as Tehran will not recant its position and Allawi will not hesitate to shoot at the Iranian roles – throughout the region – and render them a synonym of the support of terrorism, what will be the exit? Will this not obstruct the implementation of the silent American-Iranian “agreement”? What is alarming is that the efforts to secure the implementation of any agreement between Washington and Tehran will likely generate a high cost in exchange for the facilitation of a “safe” withdrawal for the American troops from Iraq. What is even more alarming is that Washington has started paying in advance, by recognizing the Iranian role in any Afghan settlement and by encouraging Iran to play the role of Iraq's good neighbor, while at the same time accepting its tutelage over the Land of the Two Rivers. As for Iran, it will not be able to get the desired payments unless it overcomes the obstacle of Allawi and his List, which is accusing Al-Maliki of selling the country and of distributing free “guarantees”.
