President Mahmud Ahmadinejad arrived to Lebanon just to say that Iran is present here in the country, but also present here near the border with Israel. As for the speeches he issued from the Baabda Palace, the southern Suburb of Beirut and from the South, they were similar to his usual speeches in regard to the Lebanese domestic situation, the regional situation and the international situation, whether inside or outside Tehran. Therefore, there was nothing new at this level. On the other hand, the visit did not herald that war in the region or in Lebanon has become imminent or that strife among the Lebanese was also growing closer. The status quo or the state of “no war and no peace” in the region is the more stable possibility for the time being. As for the visit of the Iranian president to the Land of the Cedars, it will not change anything at the level of this status quo as it was feared by many. The importance of the visit resides in the fact that it fell within a critical political context, whether in Lebanon, Iraq or Palestine. It also occurred amid the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear file and on the eve of the preparations for a new round of talks between the Islamic Republic and the six states mid next month. This moment gave the visit its meanings, but also allowed the repetition of the positions. This time however, the repetition was seen in Lebanon which is a special location carrying a lot of significance, not the least of which being the fact that throughout the past decades it constituted the main “arena” for the international and regional conflicts which are headed either toward settlements of comprehensive wars. The Iranian president came to Lebanon to appear from Bint Jbeil and say to the Israelis, the Palestinian authority and the Americans that the settlement will not pass, that he has a presence, a say and a position and to reiterate the insistence on the resistance. It was as though he were trying to maintain the momentum he acquired in Baghdad after he drew up the map of the new government and tilted the balance in his own favor. In Beirut, he is also drawing up new and clearer borders for the game, both for Lebanon and the region, while all that is left for the others is to reconsider their positions, reshuffle their cards and redirect their stands. He wanted to say that the issue of the resistance's arms was no longer a Lebanese affair determined by the Lebanese alone – knowing they are unable to do that to begin with – and has become an Iranian affair that is part of the conflict with the West and the regional balance of powers. During his visit, the Iranian president tightened the bond between the situation in Lebanon and the situation in the region. Certainly, Hezbollah did not need an urgent help from Tehran since it enjoys excessive power and a wide network of allies. In other words, the visit did not change the balance of power on the Lebanese domestic arena, as much as it corroborated once again that the resistance was an influential element in the regional balance of powers. It is the spearhead of the “popular resistance front”, which includes Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Iraq and the Islamic Republic as it was announced by Ahmadinejad. It is a safety net to enhance the presence of the resistance at a difficult political stage through which it is passing nowadays, rather than an invitation to resume fighting in South Lebanon. The visitor never said anything from Bint Jbeil alluding to the reopening of the front, i.e. in violation of resolution 1701 or against the deployment of the international troops guarding the border. Although President Ahmadinejad warned that Israel was withering, the “popular resistance” will not enter it tomorrow and there is no fear of an imminent war. The resistance never became organized in any country outside of Lebanon and may never be. Turkey is still holding on to the peaceful process in the region. It does not want war in Palestine or war between the Islamic Republic and its rivals. Syria for its part is also holding on to a just and comprehensive solution and wants negotiations, but through the Turkish mediator. In other words, it is practically awaiting the return of understanding between Ankara and Tel Aviv, even if this condition means it does not currently want to negotiate with Benjamin Netanyahu. As for Iraq, it is a completely different story, as it is witnessing enough infighting between its groups and components, and will remain outside the equation for quite some time. Moreover, the resistance candidates in this country have established truce with the Americans and are continuing to do so! In Palestine, half the country is around the negotiations table and the other is seeking someone to negotiate with it… as long as the options are limited. Moreover, Tehran is preparing for a new round of talks with the six states over its nuclear program mid next month, more than it is preparing to sharpen the war tool and mobilize the “resistance.” President Ahmadinejad's visit enhanced Hezbollah's status at this critical political moment, but at the same time increased the fears of its partners or rivals in the country. True, the Lebanese who are on the brink of strife agreed to uphold truce so that the visit could be conducted in a calm atmosphere. However, the existing crisis will push them toward new clashes and the reconsideration of many calculations. And while the Iranian visitor abstained – at least in public – from addressing the domestic disputes and especially the issue of the international tribunal, his call upon the Lebanese to uphold their unity accompanied his call to uphold the resistance, the spearhead of the rejectionism project and that of the opposition against the American and Israeli projects. Does this not mean he is standing alongside it in its invitation to undermine the court, or is he saying that Tehran is a partner in the solution? Nothing was leaked from the outcome of the visit indicating that the Iranian president proposed a settlement or a formula that would lead Lebanon out of the current predicament. He rather increased the fears when he placed Lebanon at the head of the “resistance front of the people,” a thing which the Lebanese can no longer handle. Did he forget the history of wars which destroyed Lebanon, between those who wanted to turn it into a platform for the liberation of Palestine and those who called for its neutrality at times and for keeping it in the ranks of Arab consensus and “joint Arab action” at others? Lebanon's placement at the head of this regional resistance distances it from the other front represented by the quasi-consensus seen within the Arab League in regard to the settlement, the peaceful solutions and the Arab initiative. On the other hand, although President Ahmadinejad converged and is still converging with Syria over the sustainment and protection of the resistance, he may have activated something which might not rise up to the level of opposition or conflict, or shaken the strategic alliance between the two countries. Certainly, it is not easy to say that Tehran's role in Lebanon has become greater than Damascus' role (although some noted the absence of any reference to Syria in the Iranian president's speeches.) Syria cannot tolerate anything but the first position in the small country and if others seem to have ambitions at this level, the “Arab deterrence force” experience that was spread throughout Lebanon following the two-year war (1975-1976) is still vivid. At the time, the Arab interference ended with the surrendering of the entire country to Syria, a move which was later on consecrated by an American consent on the eve of the Kuwait liberation war. If Damascus humored Tehran and Washington in their selection of Al-Maliki instead of his opponent Iyad al-Allawi, it is because it knew that Iran had more in Iraq than it did – although it can obstruct the rule in the country if its interests are ever threatened. In any case, it forced Al-Maliki when he visited it to “stage a coup” contrary to all what he had announced against it in the past and to make promises and pledges to it. This is the same thing it wants from Saad al-Hariri. It wants a “similar” coup whether through the arrest warrants issued against his team or through the attempts to annul the international tribunal! Furthermore, if some in Lebanon are opposed to the monopolization of the war decision by the resistance, will Syria accept not to have the final say in this regard? Was this not one of the reasons for the conflict in Lebanon between the Palestine Liberation Organization whose leader Yasser Arafat called for “the independent Palestinian national decision” and Hafez al-Assad's Syria, which was afraid of seeing such a decision implicating it in a war it did not want – considering it was and is still holding on to the decisions related to the “timing and location of the battles?” President Bashar al-Assad's visit to Riyadh yesterday carried numerous messages. It was similar to the visit he conducted to Ankara a few months ago, after he had received President Ahmadinejad in Damascus where he issued threats against Israel and the West. It was as though the Syrian president wanted to maintain a specific distance with Tehran. The greatest message revealed by his visit to Riyadh was that Syria - which does not make any compromise in regard to its alliance with the Islamic Republic - will not allow the attempts to undermine its understanding with or distance it from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This understanding includes both Iraq and Lebanon. Therefore, Damascus is always trying to dissipate many questions raised by President Ahmadinejad during his tours and in his positions. On the other hand, while Syria feels involved in Iraq, Lebanon remains the main priority along with Palestine, and while its relations with Turkey somewhat compensate for what it used to enjoy with Egypt, it cannot risk the relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Will the dust of the two visits dissipate and result in a tripartite understanding that would spare Lebanon from its fate and distance the cups of strife and the indictment along with their repercussions? If this desired goal is achieved, Ahmadinejad's visit to Lebanon would be a “welcomed visit!”
