Is Iran able to fill the void that was left in the Middle East by the suicide of the Soviet Union, and with it now the turmoil of the US presence and the signs of its attenuation in some places? Did Iran have this dream, and does it have a project of such type and magnitude? Can a country with Iran's capabilities, despite its importance, enter into such a costly wager? Does its current regime enable it to wage a battle on such a broad scale? Can its economy bear such expectations? Does the Islamic Republic lament under the weight of the obligations it has undertaken just like the Soviet Union lamented under the burden of the obligations it had beyond its borders? Is Khomeini's country able to bear the repercussions of sliding into a costly armament race? Does Iran want to expel the US from the region that floats on natural resources, and whose security and causeways are a vital issue for the global economy, and US and Western power? Or does Iran seek to impose itself as America's first partner in managing the region and taking the necessary security and stability measures in it? Was the attempt to weaken Israel and shake the security of its towns with waves of rockets, an attempt to remind the US of its need to other partners in the region and other pillars for a different role? Can the July war be put in this context? Was what President Jalal Talabani told us once in Damascus and another time in Baghdad accurate, about the fact that Tehran is ready to negotiate with Washington from Afghanistan to Lebanon, if the US administration takes the stance that is considered by the Iranian leadership to be indispensable for negotiation? Or does the permanent tension with Washington represent the permanent need of the current regime, i.e. the need for cohesion on the domestic front and a continued nurturing of the hostility towards America on the foreign front? Is it true that the Iranian response to the US and international sanctions is currently taking place in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in addition to Iraq and Lebanon? Is it true that Iran has achieved steps in its program to turn into a religious and political reference for Shi'a in the world, regardless of their nationality and language? Does this mean that a good relation with Iran has become one of the prerequisites for stability in these countries, and that a good relation has a political price that must be paid? Is it true for instance that consensual governments in Lebanon or Iraq are a formula to arrange external roles in the decision-making of Beirut and Baghdad, with Iran having the first role in both capitals? Is it true that Iran's current program does not go beyond raising the negative responses of the Arab Khartoum? Can Tehran replace Cairo in such a role? Can Ahmadinejad replace Jamal Abdul Nasser? Is it true that the Sunni-Shi'a susceptibilities are merely western attempts to stir up a conflict, or did the size of the Iranian program and what took place in Baghdad and Beirut lead to the awakening of the conflict after it was dormant? Was Khomeini's revolution making long-term calculations when it chose to appear to the region through shutting down the Israeli embassy in Tehran, at a time when Egypt was abandoning the military aspect of the conflict with Israel and making peace with it in exchange of restoring all its occupied territories? Is it true that it is too late to arrange the Arab house, after the incidents in Iraq and Lebanon led to the infiltration of some of the regional house constituents to the confused decisions room in the Arab house? Is it also true that the Arab guaranteeing triangle has become a thing of the past, and that the best that can be expected is a quintuple leadership of the region that would include the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian triangle as well as Iran and Turkey? Is it true that Arabs have to ask Erdogan for help in order to avoid having to completely be covered with the Iranian cloak? Is it true that Lebanon cannot endure its new function of being the launching pad for changing and turning equations around? And is it true that Lebanon is changing and transforming, thus increasing the distance among its constituents? Is it also true that Lebanon cannot endure this much attachment of some of the region's inhabitants with some of its citizens? I followed Ahmadinejad's visit to Lebanon on TV; it was important and interesting. I asked myself the questions that come to the mind of those following it from Cairo, Riyadh, Baghdad, or Damascus. It is a visit loaded with excitement and questions, from the Baabda palace to Bint Jbeil, through the southern suburbs.
