Although there are great hopes today hanging on the meeting between Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu, based on the serious stance taken by the current administration and its support of a two-state solution, it is only logical to notice the obstacles that could hinder such a solution, during the time period that allows Obama to exert pressure on the Israeli stance. First there are the different perspectives of the two sides on the priorities of the solution. Indeed, the Obama administration makes a clear distinction between the solution to the Palestinian issue and the ongoing crisis with Iran, and considers that Israel's flexibility on the Palestinian issue would strengthen Washington's stance and help it obtain the regional support that it needs in facing Iran, whereas in Netanyahu's view, Tehran's continued obstinacy in the nuclear issue strengthens the stance of the forces of refusal in the region, including the Palestinian movements whose approval – or at least non-obstruction – will be needed for any solution. There is also the inherited weak trust – on the Arab side – in the seriousness of the United States in its support of a balanced solution in the region. It is true that Obama comes to the White House from a different background than most of those who preceded him, as he has so far proved to be serious in dealing with the region's issues, through his contacts with its leaderships and his tendency to address Arabs and Muslims directly, in order to remove the negative impact made by the previous administration. Nevertheless, reservations have openly been made in the region regarding his ability to be “independent” from Israel's interest. Such reservations are strengthened by the decisions taken by his administration so far, whether regarding sanctions against Syria, or continuing to classify Hamas and Hezbollah as “terrorist” organizations, in addition of course to its stance towards Iran. All of this does not help him to gain the trust of those he needs to facilitate the solution. The discourse of those when addressing Obama can be summed up by their slogan: we want deeds, not words. As for the limits of the US's ability to put pressure on Israel, it is a third obstacle. Much has been written in the past weeks over the possibility of an Israeli-American confrontation, and over the tendency of American Jews to support any form of pressure Obama could exert on Netanyahu, based on the idea that “we know what is in Israel's interest better than they do.” However, there are few, in Israel and the US, who believe that such pressures could lead to a rupture of relations between the two. Indeed, Obama will be preparing – in two years at most – to wage the campaign for his second term in office, and it is therefore in his interest to walk on a thin line in any strict stance towards an elected Israeli government. Furthermore, his administration has effectively missed the opportunity to intervene in favor of the moderates during the last Israeli elections, as Bill Clinton had tried to against Netanyahu in 1996 – and failed. Clinton was forced after that to deal with the leader of the Likud for three years, after which he came out with words about Netanyahu that are difficult to publish: That *** doesn't want a settlement! Netanyahu is not the kind of man who would seek a confrontation with Washington if he can avoid it. Thus we are not expected today to hear of a “rupture in relations” between Israel and the United States. Indeed, Israel's Prime Minister has listened to much advice over the importance of taking a flexible stance towards any suggestions Obama might put forth. Shimon Peres has also asked him to avoid confronting the new administration, because of the negative repercussions such a confrontation would have on Israel's security. Within this framework, the Israeli Haaretz newspaper reported yesterday from one of Netanyahu's aides that, in order to avoid a clash with the Americans, he will present Obama with the idea of forming a working party from both sides, one that would put down a new roadmap based on the participation of moderate Arab states in any settlement with the Palestinians. He also calls for these states to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, because, according to the Israeli source, they can help “advance the peace process with the Palestinians.” Israel's blackmailing of the US thus relies on three fronts: the stance towards Iran; demands of expanding diplomatic relations with the Arabs prior to peace; and the condition that the Palestinians accept the “Jewish state” before starting negotiations. Faced with such blackmail, it becomes natural to ask about the effectiveness of the assets held by Obama, which could allow him to impose on the Israelis the solution that he wants, one which Clinton could not impose, that is if it is in Obama's intention to do so.
