President Barack Obama kept the promises he made to voters about two years ago, thus announcing the withdrawal of over ninety thousand soldiers from Iraq “in a major step toward ending the war.” He presented this “accomplishment” to his electorate once again on the threshold of the congressional mid-term elections and halfway into his term for the renewal of which he will soon launch his campaign. He did not talk about the future of Iraq, just as he did not talk about the future relations with this country. He did not point to what the war did or did not accomplish, nor did he tackle the difficulties facing the Iraqis in the management of their country, whether in terms of politics or security. It is still too soon to present a final assessment of the results of the war on Iraq. Therefore, seven years after the war has started, it would be as easy to say that the United States was defeated, as it would be to say that it achieved victory and accomplished its goals or that Iran won and will have the final say in the country, while Washington and Baghdad's other neighbors – and there are so many of them – will no longer have any influence. It is still too soon to present a final assessment, firstly because the withdrawal will not be made in full before the end of next year, and secondly because Iraqi political and security commands believe that the American presence should be upheld for years to come. Even Iran cautioned the Iraqis that the current pullout was fictive and that the American troops will remain under other designations, whether as elements in private security companies or any other function, as though it did not want to deal with the reality of the pullout which will force it to reconsider its stand and rhetoric. Far from the pretexts formulated by the United States and Britain to legitimize the war, the latter war carried several goals and headlines which fell in the context of the so-called preemptive wars, i.e. the transfer of the battle on “terrorism” outside America and Europe. On the ground, Al-Qaeda's fighters flocked to Iraq where they established their “emirate” and their activities were revived during the last two weeks after they had received harsh blows during the past three years. Consequently, the Iraqis are scared they will restore their previous momentum in light of the political deadlock, which could bring back the ghost of civil war. The war also emerged as the last battle in the context of the Kuwait liberation war led by President George Bush Sr. and was not completed following the exit of the Iraqi army from Kuwait. However, the mission was finished by Bush Jr. almost a decade later. A lot was said about the reasons behind Saddam's invasion. But at this point, it would be useful to recall that what made the United States mobilize the largest military campaign with wide international and Arab support was firstly the necessity to prevent Saddam from going too far and appointing himself as master over the Gulf, i.e. over the oil fields and passageways! This was the same reason for the occupation of Iraq in 2003, i.e. to build an American “base” to be added to the dozens of bases spread throughout the Gulf in order to protect this vital vein for industrial countries. Indeed, its presence under the protection of the American forces is providing Washington with a card to face the rising powers which need this vein, from Europe to Japan going through India and China. Therefore, it is not easy to believe that the United States will turn its back on Iraq with all the repercussions that this step could cause around the region which witnessed three wars in three decades, in all of which America was more present than it ever was since the Vietnam War. Indeed, after all these sacrifices, could it possibly leave Iraq to Iran along with the future of the Gulf? Had the issue been that simple, the deal between Washington and Tehran would have been sealed a long time ago, since what the Islamic Republic wants before nuclear arms and after the discontinuation of the interference in its domestic affairs, is the recognition of its influential role in the region on the political, military, security and oil levels. This would probably explain why on the eve of Obama's fulfillment of his promise, certain American circles reiterated that the pullout of the American troops in no way meant a departure from Iraq. This was also stated by new American Ambassador to Baghdad James Jeffrey, who bluntly assured that his country will not relinquish Iraq, stating: “We are not even leaving Iraq. We are simply allowing ourselves to end our ground military presence.” In that same context, he did not forget to say to those concerned about Iraq's future that he did not sense a powerful Iranian influence in the country, using as proof Tehran's failure to get the Shiite alliance to form a new government five months after the parliamentary elections! This was also noted by some observers when the Iraqi Shiite leaders flocked to Beirut about two months ago to participate in the funerals and condolences of Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent Lebanese and Arab Shiite reference. It is known that the man never agreed with the Iranian leaders over many political affairs and religious interpretations, which revealed among other things that the Shiites of Iraq are holding on to their reference in Najaf as much as they are holding on to their Arab identity. Amid the goals which were or were not achieved, is the United States' profit from the “controlled” expansion of the Islamic Republic toward the Gulf through its allies and tools. Indeed, this expansion constitutes a source of concern and fear for the states of region, thus forcing their people to seek security and military arrangements with America among other powers, just like they did after the invasion of Kuwait. It is known that such arrangements are accompanied by political and economic conditions and trade-offs. Moreover, one of the goals of the war is what was mentioned by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who said a few months before leaving office that the war on Iraq eliminated a main danger which threatened Israel. Indeed, Iraq was removed from the Arab pan in the balance of power with Tel Aviv and there was no longer an eastern door for the Arab world. Moreover, it is needless to recall what happened between the Palestinians and the Iraqis following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, as well as the pleading made by the Palestinians living in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. This also brings back to mind what was written in many Iraqi newspapers about the Israeli presence in Kurdistan. Also among the goals of the war on Iraq was the establishment of a democratic regime in Baghdad in the context of the so-called “New Middle East,” thus constituting an archetype to be followed by neighboring regimes especially in Iran and Syria and hastening the transfer of the “illness” to these two countries. However, this goal merely hastened the two countries' hostility toward and fight against the American presence in Iraq, while the painful reality showed that the rising “democratic system” and the absolute failure of the Iraqi leaders turned Iraq into an easy arena open to all possible interferences, whether by the close or the distant neighbors. Despite all that was or was not achieved by this war, the Islamic Republic is aware of the fact that it has many non-American competitors in Iraq as well, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria - its strategic ally – and that if it is unable to prevail in the country, there will be wars and deadly chaos. Although it had agreed with Syria to hinder the American project in the period following the fall of Baghdad, the current reasons behind their fear from the American presence are no longer the same. In reality, it is unlikely that they are reassured by the country's descent toward chaos, considering that this would jeopardize their interests and allies and pose a threat on them despite the fact that they have conflicting interests in regard to the future of Iraq. Indeed, there was a quasi Arab assignment to Syria to “uphold Iraq's Arab identity” even though Damascus is aware of the limits of its role in the country, while its geographic position enhanced Iran's desperate need for it at the level of more than one card, namely the Lebanon (Hezbollah) card and the Palestine (Hamas's command in Damascus) card. This consequently allowed it to impose certain concessions on its strategic ally. On the other hand, the racial, sectarian and denominational formula in Iraq will continue – as it is the case with the Lebanese – to force the Iraqis to resort to foreign powers to contain the possible explosion. In other words, the Sunnis, the Kurds and other entities and powers will continue to feel the need for an American, Arab and Turkish support to confront the Iranian “prevalence” in the country. In the meantime, the United States did not achieve many of its goals through the Iraq war, but this did not prompt Iran to celebrate Washington's defeat since the confrontation is in and over the country. Therefore, as long as it has not yet reached the turning point between a settlement and the resumption of war which had started in Afghanistan, continued in Iraq and reproduced into wars between South Lebanon and Gaza among others, all that the Iraqis and the Arabs can do is count their losses.
