The Yemeni government would be wrong to underestimate or ignore Al-Qaeda's announcement of its support for the separatist movement in southern Yemen. It is true that there are many reasons for Sana'a to be concerned about the activity of those who now call themselves the Peaceful Southern Movement, as they call for returning, by any means, the situation in Yemen twenty years back, i.e. to before the reunification. However, Al-Qaeda's entrance on the scene will give this movement unprecedented support, not to say the support it had been hoping for. There are politicians in the south who were harmed by the reunification. There are also violations that have occurred in practice, violations that could be described as “normal” in an Arab country – particularly when power is in the hands of a party that has its own interests and applies its own methods, not to mention that it inherited an internal war against the southerners, with everything that this entails. Such violations should be dealt with within the framework of political practice, far from exclusion and favoritism. Nevertheless, jumping from this to calls for secession does not solve the problems of the south, nor does it reduce the impact of the economic and security crisis from which everyone is suffering. Moreover, Yemen has experienced division and should have learned from the experience, so as not to repeat it. However, behind the support announced by Nasser Al-Wahishi, who has dubbed himself “leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, the organization has an objective that goes far beyond reforming the situation in the south. Breaking down countries that Al-Qaeda can turn into footholds for itself is the best way to ensure chaos at the security level, which would provide it with opportunities to engage in its activities in the absence of a strong central authority. The Yemeni leadership is aware of this, and President Ali Abdullah Saleh has warned at many an occasion – even before Al-Qaeda's recent statement – of the dangers of the “Iraqization and Somalization” Yemen is faced with. The southern separatists may have their own “reform” program, or a tendency to consider the southern provinces to be “more advanced” than their northern counterparts, and hence to be qualified for independence. They may also have socialist dreams inherited from the time of the separation, fuelled by contacts with leaderships abroad, such as former South Yemen President Ali Nasir Mohammad or Ali Salim Al-Baydh and others. Yet Al-Qaeda only looks at such circumstances with the aim of exploiting them. Indeed, in Al-Qaeda's view, internal conflicts are less important than the “cosmic war” it is waging against the “infidels”, with the slogan that “in Islam, there is no difference between Northerner and Southerner, white or black, Najdi or Kuwaiti”. Thus Al-Qaeda sees nothing that would prevent an alliance at this stage in Yemen with those whom it fights in other countries because of their social and political backgrounds. This includes for example the alliance with and defense of the Al-Houthi rebel movement in Saada, despite the difference in ideology, as well as with Yemeni tribal figures such as Sheikh Tareq Al-Fadhli, son of the last Fadhli Sultan of the Abyan province, who fought with Osama Bin Laden and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan, before allying himself with Ali Abdullah Saleh's government then finally turning against it. Shall we say that Al-Qaeda does nothing new when it declares Yemen a territory for its activities, considering Osama Bin Laden's well-known connections and roots there? Would we be introducing a new element if we say that the dangers of Al-Qaeda's renewed activity in Yemen do not affect this country alone, but can also reflect negatively on the achievements that were made in the war against this Takfiri terrorist organization in neighboring countries? Hence it is important to make every effort to confront the separatist movement in the south, which has now become a pretext for such an Al-Qaeda intrusion into Yemen's affairs. Such a confrontation will not succeed if it is restricted to the security aspect alone, which is what the authorities have resorted to – especially in clashes with Al-Houthi's followers. Indeed, it must include political action as well, by restoring the deteriorating relations between the General People's Congress (GPC) party and its partners in unified Yemen, as an indispensable means to confront the calls for secession.
