Some people in Lebanon are talking about the civil strife that could result from an indictment by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. They are acting as if it is something preordained, and a certainty; they are frightening people and confusing them about their destinies, and the country's future. Others are behaving as if an Israeli war against Lebanon is also preordained, and that there is no way to avoid or prevent it, or to defend against its pernicious effects. Meanwhile, the events of recent days indicate that avoiding civil strife is possible, and that a lessening of the possibility is linked to the Lebanese themselves, if they wish. This is irrespective of the foreign, interfering party that might be planning this strife, and irrespective of the “conspiracy” that Lebanese and Arabs are so fond of, especially in relying on this notion to interpret many items, and the errors by some groups, which have fallen into the trap of civil violence on several occasions. This has taken place as the leaders of these groups use ideological, global and nationalist big rhetoric, which serves personal interests at times, and other narrow interests at others, and links to foreign parties most of the time. Some of these leaders have conducted self-evaluations, and acknowledged their regret for these decisions, which previously took the country in the direction of blood baths, waves of migration and social backwardness, which is difficult to detect easily, and can only be compensated for over generations. It is a backwardness whose effects are still felt by the Lebanese economy today. The same goes for the country's political structure, which has become more sectarian and ugly, fed by some sick minds, taking advantage of passing conditions and ignorant of the impossibility of reining in fanaticism once its fires have been stoked. In the past – and certain people should pay attention to this – the greatest evidence of the possibility of avoiding civil strife was that many leaders who were described during the civil war as “traditional and reactionary” did not get involved in the war, and did not stumble into arming themselves and engaging in incitement, even though they retained their political status, and continued to stand in opposition to the conditions of the day. Today, the clearest proof about the possibility of avoiding civil strife is the stream of statements by Lebanese politicians about the dispute over the STL, calling for a cooling-off. This follows a number of statements that contained threats of disasters and destruction. The most important such statement here was by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who engaged in blackmail with his political rivals, threatening them with crisis, and promising to label them pro-Israelis. Some of Nasrallah's allies have made up accusations against these rivals and threatened them with another 7 May, or bout of civil strife, or even worse. The proof that the preparation of a climate of civil strife, or avoiding such a development, is in the hands of the Lebanese, first of all, is that Nasrallah's call for calm put the political arena at ease, after Prime Minister Saad Hariri renewed his affirmation that he was committed to foiling civil strife. Was this participation by the tripartite Saudi-Syrian-Lebanese summit in reducing the fears of civil strife actually behind them? While there was an acknowledgment of Hezbollah's right to politically defend itself against the possibility of being accused of involvement in the assassination of former Premier Rafiq Hariri, amid Israeli leaks that sought to pour oil on the flames, could it not have been possible to avoid blaming Israel's actions on the party's partners in the government, state, and country, before the summit convened? Is it reasonable that the hints about some of these partners being traitors could disappear, just by the holding of a summit? Logically speaking, is it not the case that the Hariri assassination, to begin with, was the cause of civil strife? Would it not be logical to behave according to this conviction in order to contain all of the possible repercussions, instead of accusing the search for the truth of being a treasonous act? As for the preordained war, in the view of some, the fact that the Lebanese Army declined to fire at the Israeli Army as it cut down some trees from an area that Lebanon claims, is proof of the possibility of avoiding this war that Israel is planning. The decision resulted from rational calculations of avoiding seeing the country head toward a confrontation from which the Jewish state will benefit, with Hezbollah dragged into a fight whose final form is difficult to control. The new element is that the army foiled the possibility of a wide-scale confrontation erupting, not because it surrendered, one day after it fired at the Israeli army, and caused losses in the ranks of the enemy. This means that the army cannot be accused of weakness because its calculations were connected to the Lebanese interest, and nothing else. The army behaved as if the matter was not about a tree, but also an issue of protecting the country.
