General McChrystal may have equally broken the strict rules of military conduct and the principles of civilian courtesy by directing personal criticism, both unusual and public, at President Barack Obama and at the senior staff in his administration in charge of the Afghan file. And this may well cost him his job as Commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan. Yet the man knew exactly what he was saying and calculated the perspectives and expected reactions to it. This is why he insisted that his comments be published after the management of the magazine which conducted the interview consulted him before publication, having found the Administration in Washington to have brought down its hesitancy and weak decision-making on him and his soldiers. Indeed, the Administration made him bear responsibility for finding solutions to the predicament NATO forces are facing in “the land of corruption and opium”, but worked at the same time on obstructing his recommendations and ganged up against them every time it had the chance. The general's statements have made him look like the tortured figure in the painting “The Scream” by Norwegian artist Edvard Munch, where the blood-smeared red sky above would only be Afghanistan, which the Taliban have returned to ruling during the night as well as for a substantial portion of the day, while military operations there intensify and NATO's human losses increase. This military man, who spent 35 years of his life in the army, found no other means to make his voice heard by the American people, who are so far unable to understand whether their army is waging a war there or a “PR” campaign to achieve reconciliation between the greatest and wealthiest power on the face of the earth and Mullah Omar's ragged-clothed, long-bearded, cave-dwelling men. It is no secret that Barack Obama has sought since the first day of his presidency to disassociate himself from the Republican wars he inherited, considering the priority to be rebuilding the US interior and reversing the deterioration afflicting the standing of United States. And while justifications for the decision to withdraw from Iraq were prepared and convincing, since that country never fought against US nor threatened it in the first place, the situation in Afghanistan, the country which had fostered the planners of the September 11 attacks, seemed much more complicated and confused. When McChrystal came to the White House about a year ago to convince Obama that flexing US muscles was the only way to make the Taliban agree to end the fighting and enter into a settlement, and that it was imperative to strengthen the role of Afghan President Hamid Karzai in spite of his flaws, because one cannot antagonize all Afghans at the same time, he found Obama hesitant to take the decision to send additional troops, not just because this went against the withdrawal strategy he had adopted, but also because his ideas on the issue were confused due to the numerous interferences by the major figures in his Administration. Thus, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seeks to strengthen the role of Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, who strongly supported her battle within the Democratic Party to run for President. As for the Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, he was Commander of US troops in that country until 2007 and behaves on the basis that he is a certified expert on its affairs. The reports filed by these two men have focused on the impossibility of dealing with the Afghan President due to his corruption and called for finding a replacement for him, reflecting their ignorance of the history of Afghanistan and the structure of tribal interests there. Yet McChrystal's theory later met with the President's favor when it turned out to serve his final objective, i.e. withdrawal. Obama decided to send 30 thousand additional troops, while the general forged strong cooperation with Karzai in order to build up the Afghan army and set forth initiatives of “good will” towards the Taliban and the factions supporting them, which produced a clear disruption in the front hostile to Kabul. And it seemed that matters were heading towards improvement with the successful military campaign in Marja, until dallying returned to dominate Washington's decision-making, both in terms of sending more troops and in terms of dealing with Karzai. Thus McChrystal's efforts seemed as if suspended in the air and his mission threatened with failure, a situation which the insurgency made use of, intensifying the rate of its operations and raising the benchmark of its attacks to inflict greater losses. Thus the circle of those who shed doubt on the possibility of winning the war rapidly grew to reach the ranks of the US Army itself, which coincided with a number of countries participating in the NATO force declaring their desire to withdraw. This thus quickened McChrystal's departure from the discipline which should be the hallmark of any soldier's behavior towards his political leadership. But will his scream be sufficient to draw Obama out of his hesitancy and stop this confusion, reminiscent of the last days of the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan?
