The battle to lift the blockade imposed on Gaza has become an open one launched by the brutal Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla. However, Turkey was not the only one to spark it – considering that the international community with its popular forces, civil organizations and media contributed to increasing the pressures on Benjamin Netanyahu's government, as well as on the other concerned governments, in order to put an end to the suffering of the Palestinian people. This was especially true in the case of the sides involved in the Quartet Committee which stood behind this large prison in the Strip and the slow death of every reason to live in it for around four years. The blockade hit the electricity, water, food, health, construction and industry sectors. In other words, it hit everything but still failed to achieve the desired goal: to strike Hamas, weaken it or force it to recant its positions by getting it to recognize Israel and the agreements the latter signed with the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Authority which emerged from it, and reject violence or “terrorism.” It thus wished to see the discontinuation of the resistance, which was halted on the ground in any case following the war on Gaza at the end of 2008-beginning of 2009. Under quasi-unanimous international pressures, Israel forcibly started alleviating the restrictions and expanding the list of goods and materials allowed into Gaza… but with conditions. In reality, all the sides that found themselves in the heart of the battle to lift the blockade – from the parties of the “Quartet Committee” to Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, the Arab League and certainly the different Palestinian sides including the authority and the factions – mobilized their forces, some seeking political gains and others trying to limit the losses or reposition themselves, while awaiting to see what is in store for the region and the surprises which will be carried by the Palestinian cause. The battle thus exceeded its bilateral Turkish-Israeli framework and Ankara's conditions to restore normalcy in the relations with Tel Aviv, a step which was linked to Tel Aviv's acceptance of an international investigation commission into the Marmara massacre and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. Indeed, the international storm which erupted in the face of the Israeli attack on the Turkish ship and the repercussions of this attack helped Washington rearrange the priorities of its initiative and facilitated the movement of its envoy George Mitchell between the Palestinian Authority and Netanyahu's government. President Barack Obama, for his part, drew up the roadmap for the required ending of the blockade on the American and international levels, and put forward the “security for food” equation which forced the sides concerned by the solution to proceed in line with this equation. The American administration and the Quartet Committee were not expected to ask Israel to lift the blockade without anything in return, seeing how this request would have meant the recognition of Hamas's victory and its partnership in any solution as an equal to the Palestinian Authority. In other words, the Quartet Committee which converged with the Turkish position in calling for the discontinuation of the humanitarian suffering of the people of Gaza, did not converge with it in considering that Hamas is not a “terrorist movement” as it was stated by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Moreover, the international community was not expected to pressure Israel to lift the land and sea blockade it is imposing under the pretext of preventing the access of Iranian weapons to Gaza, at a time when the ink with which resolution 1929 – that imposed a tighter siege on the Islamic Republic - was written, had not yet dried. The Freedom Flotilla moved a lot of stagnant water in the region, as the tours of the American peace envoy started to revolve around the translation of the “security for food equation.” This is what Netanyahu wanted as a substitute for the discussion of the key issues, namely the border, security, refugees and Jerusalem issues among other final situation matters in preparation for the establishment of the state. Mitchell's discussions with Tel Aviv, Ramallah and Cairo thus revolved around this issue, while Washington drew up a clear border for the lifting of the blockade by linking the alleviation of the restrictions on the crossings to the presence of international monitors to prevent the arrival of weapons to the Strip. In this context, American Vice President Joe Biden announced – following the attack on Marmara – that his country recognized Israel's right to search the ships “because it is in a state of war with Hamas.” For its part, the European Union supported Washington at the level of this equation, as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, Catherine Ashton, announced last week that the Union intended to deploy a naval military mission off Gaza to monitor the transportation of goods into the Strip in the context of the alleviation of the blockade. She also stated that the Union wished to “establish a regular passageway” via the land crossings, and if possible by sea, calling on the Israeli government to allow the passage of all products, excluding weapons, and suggesting a contribution in searching these goods. On the other hand, Obama's administration cautioned that the blockade issue was not linked to any other, i.e. neither to the case of captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit nor to that of inter-Palestinian reconciliation. By doing so, it removed a card from the hands of Netanyahu who also linked the blockade to Shalit's case, in an attempt to prevent Hamas from investing the international sympathy toward the people of the Strip to lift the political blockade imposed on it and secure its recognition. Likewise, the Authority rejected the measures of the Israeli miniature government, demanding the lifting of the blockade in full by opening all the crossings controlled by Israel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By doing so, it aimed at guaranteeing communication between the two and at preventing the consecration of the “two independent entities” theory and the ongoing curtailment of its “authority.” In this respect, it welcomed the opening of the Rafah crossing to ensure its return to the Strip – even if through its participation in the observers committee if the previous agreement which was prompted by former American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005 between Israel, the Authority and Egypt, is readopted. This is due to the fact that the authority fears that Washington will impose a solution for the Strip which may not go in line with some of its concerns, interests and influence. As for the movement, it considered the accomplishment secured by the Freedom Flotilla to be a victory that it could translate on the political arena by transferring the humanitarian international support toward the population of the Strip, into a political support for it and its authority in Gaza. Therefore, it rejected the “militarization” of the “Freedom Flotilla,” i.e. the Iranian offer to escort the flotilla's ships, and moved the reconciliation card outwards to impose its conditions on the authority as an equal partner to it and not to the Fatah movement. Consequently, just like the authority, it did not alleviate its stand. Indeed, neither the latter authority showed willingness to discuss Hamas's remarks before it signs the Egyptian paper, nor did the movement show willingness to sign before its notes are taken into account either as part of the paper or in the context of an official annex. At this level, it seems that the proposals of Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa and the mediations of the mediators have failed to achieve the required breakthrough in the wall of inter-Palestinian disputes, although the two Palestinian sides know that reconciliation was never an independent Palestinian headline which surfaced when each of them took a part of the remaining territory, and was rather a major headline in the wide confrontation in the region between the United States and certain Arabs on one hand, and the Islamic Republic, Syria and the movements which are loyal to them on the other. In the meantime, Cairo's concern about an American plan to lift the blockade from Rafah's side mainly while keeping Gaza outside the framework of the authority and the PLO is no secret to anyone, considering that this would further link Gaza to Egypt which would consequently be responsible for one and a half million Palestinians controlled by an Islamic movement to whom the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is the closest side and the Islamic Republic an aid-provider that cannot be relinquished. For its part, Jordan is increasing the pace of its action due to fears over its mysterious future in light of the repeated talk about a “settlement” that might eventually be imposed on all the sides involved in the conflict by America and Europe. As for the Lebanese, they are moving to lift the siege imposed on the camps, knowing that their feelings are moving as though they are resuming deferred rounds of their wars which stopped twenty years ago. However, instead of rushing to partake in the Freedom Flotilla, it would have been better had they given the people of the camps some freedom, dignity and a chance to a decent living, thus freeing themselves from the obnoxious racism which is being revived by sectarian and denominational fears, and discontinuing the exploitation of the talk about naturalization projects, the flaw that could affect the frail demography or the mayhem that could turn the camps into pits for extremist movements…
