The dinner hosted by the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki at the residence of his country's ambassador to the United Nations, and the fact that all members of the UN Security Council including the United States accepted the invitation, only reaffirm the obvious facts that Tehran refuses to see since the outbreak of the crisis over its nuclear program. The first fact is that the International Community does not spar with Iran as a state, regime or a people, and that everyone is prepared to engage it in dialogue and take its interests into consideration. It was in this context that the 5+1 group offered its incentives package to Iran, up to offering it the “ElBaradei Proposal” for exchanging enriched uranium. The second fact is that Iran did not provide anything that can be taken as guarantees regarding the nature of its nuclear program and its goals, and which would help the incentive packages take precedence over the sanctions. As a result, Iran did not succeed in convincing anyone, including its friends and allies, that all that it is doing is attempts to buy more time, and nothing else. Regarding the Iranian stances that were voiced in conjunction with Mottaki's dinner about Iran's readiness to exchange enriched uranium through Turkey or Brazil, this is yet to be translated into an actual initiative that is presented to the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, which is tasked with following up this issue. Moreover, these stances were only expressed by Iranian bureaucrats which gives them no credibility what so ever. This is particularly valid when President Ahmadinejad and then Mottaki after him, did not express a similar direction during their stay in New York, where they could have benefited from the large international presence to launch such an initiative. Thus, Iran failed in the strategy of ‘feeding mouths to buy their silence'. Everything Mottaki said regarding the ‘positive atmosphere' of the dinner with the members of the Security Council did not help pave the way for a resumption of dialogue with the International Community. Instead, the members of the 5+1 group expressed their disappointment regarding the meeting, despite the Iranian warmth, and deemed the meeting to be yet another lost opportunity in the search for a diplomatic solution for the Iranian nuclear program crisis. Note that the policy of ‘feeding mouths' was adopted by Tehran in all its international contacts, whether with China and Russia or the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, manifested through oil-related incentives and investments, with a view to gain their support in any possible vote on the sanctions against it. In truth, this is not just a failure in what regards the Iranian nuclear issue, but will also impact the new international move to render the Middle East a nuclear arms free zone, which would include the Israeli nuclear arsenal and would subject the Israeli program to the IAEA's inspection and control. While all Arab countries are pushing in the direction of the implementation of UNSC resolution 1995, and have begun to find support for this among the permanent Security Council member states, the continuing crisis of the Iranian nuclear program and the suspicions surrounding it will give a solid pretext for the parties that are reluctant in going forward with denuclearizing the region. As a result, the opportunity of an international reconsideration of nuclear proliferation in the region will be lost, especially after the interjection given by Ahmadinejad from behind his podium at the United Nations. The fact of the matter is that in Iran's behaviour in the region, there are many elements that fuel Arab concern regarding Iran's nuclear program. At a time when things seem to be moving towards new sanctions against Tehran because of this program, and towards further adversity and tensions with the international community, Iran continues its aggressive policy against the Arabs, especially in the Gulf region, and the policy of flexing its military muscles. In one week, Iran exploited more than one direct pretext to show its might and influence. This includes the successive naval manoeuvres, the insistence on calling the Arab Gulf ‘Persian' – to prove that it is an area of influence exclusive to Iran – and the unravelling of spy networks that operate on its behalf in Gulf countries. This is not to mention the retaliation in the confrontation with the United Arab Emirates over the islands issue. This aggressive policy by Tehran is inseparable from its management of the nuclear issue, especially that Iran considers the Gulf countries to be the primary theatre of the confrontation with the West should things deteriorate into a military confrontation.
