New York-The development, or the tension, in the relationship between the US and Syria, resulting from accusations against Damascus of providing Hezbollah with Scud missiles, accusations which Syria has denied and Israel has confirmed, deserves to be examined, in order to analyze its background, perspectives and repercussions on the bilateral relationship and on Syria positioning itself regionally. Indeed, the Barack Obama Administration warning the Syrian government against “the risk of miscalculation that could result from this type of escalation” was followed by a violent campaign from Congress against the Administration, warning it against the policy of leniency, opening up, dialogue and engagement with Damascus without holding it accountable for the past and without closely examining current Syrian policies towards Iran, Hezbollah and armed Palestinian groups inside Lebanon. This coincided with insinuations to the fact that the US Administration would not wage a losing and costly battle to prevent Israel from carrying out a military operation that would include Syria and would not be limited to Hezbollah, due to weapons being leaked in violation of Security Council Resolutions. Indeed, the Administration is in the process of a battle with Israel because of illegal settlement-building and escalation in Jerusalem. In fact, the relationship between the Barack Obama Administration and the Netanyahu government is growing increasingly tense, while there is recurrent talk of the US Administration preparing a plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflict, one which Israel opposes. Moreover, the US Administration is also waging the battle of strengthening sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran and working to prevent Israel from embarking on any military adventure against Iran. And because these battles have priority and are fundamental in the US's strategy, the Obama Administration will not expose them to fragility by adding to them another battle it is not convinced of, in order to restrain Israel from undertaking military operations to eliminate Hezbollah's missiles and to obstruct the routes through which military supplies are leaked to it in Syria. Thus, indications out of Washington point to the fact that the US Administration will not stand in Israel's way if it is proven beyond doubt that advanced missiles have reached Hezbollah, regardless of whether these missiles came from Syria or from Iran, reaching Hezbollah through Syria. Indeed, in both cases, Syria would be deeply involved in this crisis. If the missiles came from Iran, Tehran would thereby be violating two Security Council Resolutions, one which forbids it from exporting weapons and another which forbids any weapons being leaked to any party in Lebanon other than the Army. Regarding Syria, the matter is complicated and increasing in complexity due to Damascus's positioning, the obscurity of its aims and the excess in some of its “tactics”, shedding doubts on and raising questions over its strategy. Primarily raised is a question revolving around Syria's strategic choice towards each of Israel and Iran, and such a choice intertwining with the relations sought-after with the United States. To begin with, and if the issue of the missiles has been “fabricated” as Syria claims, having categorically denied Israel's accusations, the questions asks itself from the perspective of: what does Israel want from such escalation against Syria, and not just against Hezbollah? Israel today has crammed itself in a corner and brought international isolation upon itself. Its deteriorating relations with the US Administration have led to division within the circle of its supporters in Jewish-American organizations and to heating up the voice of part of US public opinion. The US military institution has grown restless towards Israel because it finds in its rejection of peace and its insistence on moving forward with occupation, settlement-building, oppression, assassinations, targeting of civilians, destruction of homes and expulsion, policies which are harmful to the national interest of the US. Indeed, the military institution is waging wars against extremism in numerous parts of the Muslim world, and the measures taken by Israel are feeding extremism, strengthening it and setting it against American targets because of the US continuing to embrace its “spoilt child” Israel without holding it accountable. Thus the pressures of the military institution, the US Administration and public opinion on Israel have increased, so that it may stop taking the national interest of the US lightly. Fabricating crises, provoking wars or taking decisions that had been postponed until further notice – such as confronting Hezbollah's missiles – are measures which help bring Israel out of international isolation and help it elude US pressures. Providing Hezbollah with advanced missiles is an issue that does not earn international sympathy, but in fact provokes anger and places Israel in the position of the “victim” which is “defending itself”. This may well be what Israel had planned for by fabricating the missile crisis, or it may have been offered it on a silver platter if the accusations of these additional missiles being leaked to Hezbollah turn out to be true. They are additional because Hezbollah does not deny possessing missiles which it boasts about publicly. Iran in general denies being the one to have provided Hezbollah with such missiles, and Syria always pretends that its borders with Lebanon are not under its complete control. Israel has repeatedly made clear that it could temporarily coexist with Hezbollah's arsenal at its border, but that it would not permanently coexist with such an arsenal, especially as it increases in quantity and in quality. Thus, if the Lebanese Dialogue Table fails to resolve the issue of this arsenal and if regional deals, whether with Syria or with Iran, fail to contain it, then a destructive war against all of Lebanon will be the decision taken by Israel at the end of the day. The novelty lies not in Israel's relationship with Hezbollah's arsenal on the Lebanese scene, but rather in directly threatening Syria militarily by making it bear responsibility for these missiles after Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman had spoken of “toppling the regime in Syria”. The US Administration has sought to contain Israeli-Syrian escalation and has prevented Israel from rushing to take military measures because of the Scud missiles. Nevertheless, with the rise in anger and accusations, the Administration felt that it might not be able to continue to hold back Israeli operations, and thus it escalated the investigation into Israel's claims and informed Syria through its ambassador in Washington and through the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman before Congress, saying that: “If these reports turn out to be true, (…) [then] Syria has made a mistake (…) [and] we are going to have to review the full range of tools that are available [to] us”. At first, Damascus behaved as if it had found in Israel's threats an opportunity for it to raise the banner of steadfastness and resistance. It worried a little from the effect of this on the White House's decision to return the US ambassador to Damascus – after having been withdrawn by the George W. Bush Administration in the wake of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri's assassination. Yet it quickly became reassured of its conclusion that the Barack Obama Administration would not go back on its strategic decision to engage Syria, and thus on its decision to send an ambassador to Damascus. Damascus indulging in such an assumption contributed to Washington warning it three days ago against “the risk of miscalculation”, and the heated debate among the ranks of members of Congress in the unruly session two days ago with Feltman has sent a message to Damascus that it should be very careful. Indeed, stances have emerged, articles have been published and seminars have been held, most of them warning Damascus against being excessive in “celebrating victory” to the point of intoxication. Some mentioned that the reason for Syria slipping into isolation for five years came as a result of committing the mistake of insisting on imposing an amendment to the Lebanese constitution in order to extend former President of the Republic Emile Lahoud's term in office. Many spoke of “the straw that broke the camel's back”. They pointed to the Resistance Summit hosted by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and attended by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Secretary-General of Hezbollah Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, through which Damascus hinted at replacing its declared strategic choice based on negotiations and peace by the strategic choice of resistance. If Damascus were really to go through with this, i.e. to abandon the doctrine of “negotiations are our strategic choice” and replace it with that of “resistance is our strategic choice”, then it would have to do the following: prepare for a military confrontation with Israel in a war that would take place in both Syria and Lebanon, one which Iran would not wage and which Arab armies would not take part in, and do without a relationship with Washington, one which Damascus has sought after for a long time, reaching the phase of the US ambassador being returned, the past being overlooked, Syria's leadership being dealt with as an essential party in the region, and work being done towards negotiations between Syria and Israel. However, if Syrian diplomacy is adopting maneuvers to obtain the maximum of what it wants at a time when the US, Europe and the Arabs are being lenient towards it, its wager might succeed just as it could result in a terrible failure. So far, Damascus has reaped benefits without having to pay any price, thanks to Qatari, French, Saudi, American as well as Israeli diplomacy. Damascus did this without losing or even seriously putting at risk the strategic Iranian-Syrian relationship. Today, after Damascus has informed all those concerned that their wager on splitting it way from Iran was naïve, it is behaving with the same kind of exaggeration that has characterized Iran's behavior. In other words, Damascus seems as if it is in turn trying to make Barack Obama fail and to cripple the policy of engagement he has adopted, at a time when the US President seeks to pressure Israel. Noteworthy is the fact that the ruling regimes in Israel and Iran are the ones who would benefit most from fabricating wars – through Lebanon – in order to turn international pressure away from themselves. Yet Syria seems as if playing a dangerous game between the two. There is talk – even if it seems unlikely – of a Syrian desire to bring about an Israeli military strike against itself and against Lebanon, in order to redraw the map of the region, such that Syria would take on the position of Arab leadership in confronting Israel with an alliance with Iran. Such a scenario seems unbelievable because the cost of war and the cost of such a decision would be momentous. Yet in times like these it is unwise not to take into consideration even unbelievable scenarios. Realistically, Syria will most likely run up the ladder to safeguard its relationship with the United States and to return its relationship with Israel to its restraints. Yet this crisis has placed it under the microscope of observation, and thus it would be useful for Damascus to make a show of good will. Moreover, it is necessary for the US Administration to stop burying its head in the sand in terms of the relationship between Syria and Iran – or between Syria and Lebanon – and to do all that it can to strip Israel of pretexts and prevent it from engrossing the region in costly wars.
