The recently-ramped up statements expressing the determination of the United States to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state do not reflect the reality of the debate that is taking place in US administration circles, as well as the decision-making centers and think tanks close to the White House, regarding the behavior that should be followed, and the minimum positions that should not be abandoned, if Tehran succeeds in producing a nuclear bomb, as if it is a given. Perhaps this is why Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu feels he is not required to offer any concessions to Washington on settlements, as long as it continues to keep him away from the Iranian issue and manages it in a way that does not satisfy Israel. This implicit American recognition of a nuclear Iranian was reflected by Obama's latest message to the Iranian people, on the occasion of Nawruz. Obama affirmed his will to continue dialogue and his desire to learn what Tehran wanted of him. It is also reflected in Washington's constant pressure on Israel to gain assurances that it will not act militarily on a unilateral basis. It is further reflected in the delay in presenting a new draft resolution on serious sanctions to the United Nations Security Council, to allow more time for indirect dialogue, up to now, with Iranian leaders. The article “After Iran Gets the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs, in its most recent issue, confirms that any military strike against Iran, if successful, will not be able to eliminate the nuclear program, but merely delay it by a few years. If Iran continues to enrich uranium at its current rate, it will produce a bomb before the end of Obama's term, in November 2012. The article suggests that the White House accommodate itself to this imminent reality and set conditions on Iran, to prove that it will enjoy no advantages from obtaining a bomb; rather, this will lead it to more isolation. The article specifies these three conditions: Iran must not declare a traditional war on a third country; it must not transfer technology, equipment or nuclear weapons to another party, and it should not increase its support for terrorist organizations. Otherwise it will expose itself to retaliatory military strikes, with all possible means. In other words, it sets limits to the regional role that Tehran wants Washington to recognize for it. In light of Washington's insistence on solving the Iran issue diplomatically, even if it has a bomb, we can observe the continuing hard-line American stance with regard to the special relationship with Israel and the two countries' joint security, which cannot be separated, on the occasion of the various US-Israeli meetings currently taking place. These hard-line positions serve as guarantees to the Jewish state that Iran's obtaining the bomb will not threaten it, and has nothing to do with its dispute with the Palestinians and Arabs over settlements and Jerusalem, except from the perspective of the consequences of the Iranian issue. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was totally clear when she commented, during her speech to AIPAC, that the new danger that is threatening Israel is Iranian, not Arab. She also hinted about more precise, stronger and longer-reaching missiles that Iran is sending to the region surrounding Israel, in Lebanon and Gaza, and that getting rid of this danger depends on Israel's understanding and acceptance of the American approach, and on its' participation in setting down a new map of influence in the region.
