The preoccupation with the Sahara question is coming relatively late. The issue is not crucial enough to attract a wide-scale interest, nor is it raging to the extent that it risks erupting major threats. Nonetheless, the concerned parties are portraying it as though it is an apocalypse. For this reason, the visit of United Nations envoy Christopher Ross to the region appears to be proportional to these facts, as it neither heralds good news nor does it warn of dire consequences. However, the visit will have no choice but to proceed cautiously through a minefield and those who planted the mines can no longer agree on a Road Map that can help the entire region exit this quagmire. Morocco made its pronouncement, and Ross heard from King Mohammad VI that his country supports negotiations and wants no alternative to the expanded autonomy proposal for the Saharan provinces. But there is no doubt that he will listen to counter-proposals, some of which are closer to Rabat's vision, while others differ. Moreover, from the details of all these stances, the fact that there is no side that wants to take responsibility for the failure of negotiations comes to the forefront, while there is no clear, single view of who or what should be the primary arbitrator in these talks and how long they will take, if they are resumed at all. Ross alone seems to be determined to re-classify the nature of his task. The first time, he tried the diplomatic tactic of listening calmly to the ideas and proposals, while in the second time he managed to push toward removing the psychological barrier. Perhaps this time he is moving into third gear, to give his task a new role, compared to earlier versions of his mission. In plain terms at least, the positions of the concerned parties indicate that they are moving in the direction endorsed by the Security Council, which revolves around a political framework and mechanism for negotiations. However, Ross realizes that the problem is not in the relevant Security Council resolutions, but in the disparate readings and interpretations of these texts. Therefore, the coming meeting of the Security Council in April will be an opportunity to determine which reading conforms to what the international body wants, and which path will lead to a resumption of core-issue, direction talks, without preconditions. Perhaps this aspect is what was expressed openly in the relevant resolutions, which have caused the current impasse. None of the sides has openly declared that it is setting down conditions prior to the negotiations, but none has submitted to the logic of removing the obstacles that do not help in achieving the goal either. No side can abandon its dug-in position, as long as the ceiling of any settlement depends on the consensual formula that the United Nations has chosen in placing a solution to the Sahara conflict on its agenda, calling for a solution from within, and not one that is imposed from without. Ross does not appear to be favoring a solution that combines the proposed options. This is because James Baker's experience involved rescuing the referendum plan from a collapse that took place after his resignation, and because Ross wants to base his journey on the coming resolution to be adopted by the Security Council. He has been like a fireman during the months of his tenure, as he worked to maintain the momentum for negotiations, even if they have reached a dead-end. There were two unexpected signals that appeared in tandem with Ross's visit to the region. The first focused on Morocco's exclusion from participation in the regional conference on security challenges in the Sahara and the Sahel regions. This has implications that Algeria, the host country, took note of as it excluded the Sahara issue from the region's security problems. The second was purely protocol-related, and included the convening of a meeting between the ministers of interior of Morocco and Algeria. Although the two signals are not central to Ross' concerns, he cannot erase them when it comes to the formula for a political solution to the Saharan issue, which can only be a regional and consensual one.
