The elections in Iraq, as novel of an experience as they are, pave the way for a struggle that must end with the correct choice, so as not to have this country turn into another Lebanon. Moreover, the Iraqis who went to the ballot boxes while divided between conflicting loyalties, some of them nationalistic the harm of which they have experienced in the past, and some religious the tragedies of which they are currently living through, need some time before being able to determine their belonging to Iraq alone, making use of the available margin of freedom and of their country's economic and human wealth, and committed to continuing to peacefully express their differences, two matters which are scarce in their neighborhood, a neighborhood which will certainly resist their desire to return to the ranks of decision-making countries in the region. Indeed, the nationalistic slogans Iraq and some its neighbors have known were and continue to be a veil which conceals the struggles of tyranny, oppression, subjection and fear-mongering – of the one color, one thought and one tongue. It is a form of chauvinism that does not distinguish sects, religions and social classes, but rather forcibly assimilates them, resolves their contradictions through oppression, and cancels out their multiplicity and the wealth of their differences. Discussing the leader's ideas is a crime, interpreting them is taboo, and jail and torture are a school unequalled in the art of convincing. The Iraqis have paid an extremely high price to emerge from the tunnel of the Baath, and they temporarily accepted to trade oppression and embargo for occupation, but the alternative that imposed itself on them was no better at all: sectarian division which revived a history of conflicts and their violence, loyalties to foreign countries fighting over their land with their blood, demographic fragmentation, limits and walls that have threatened the unity and the future of their country. Iran, burdened with decades and even centuries of enmity towards Mesopotamia, played an essential role in feeding the sectarian division and giving precedence to religious identity over national identity, through politics and funding at times, and through the activity of militias loyal to them at others, relying on the special relationship that arose between them and some Iraqis under Saddam's rule. Certainly it will seek, by all means, to prevent the return of any regime to Baghdad which it could consider to be an obstacle to its influence. And although a natural relationship between any two neighboring countries is supposed to be based on the principle of good neighborliness and the respect of mutual sovereignty, the nature of the Iranian regime does not really allow for such an assumption. A few months ago, the Iraqi-Iranian border witnessed an example of Tehran's behavior, when it sent a military force across the border to invade an Iraqi oil well, which it soon withdrew after the Iraqis protested, without suggesting that the crisis had been permanently resolved and that the border would not be breached again. And just as with the means Iran used in approaching the Palestinian issue, attempting to remove its Arab aspect and to turn it into a purely Islamic issue, which would justify its interference, obstructing Arab unanimity and taking on the role of partner in suggested solutions, what it is working for in Iraq serves the aim of keeping it devoid of a capable state and of its unifying identity. Nevertheless, a quick look at the distribution of votes in last Sunday's elections shows that the Iraqis have begun to find their way out of their retreats, that they have overcome the provoked walls that divided them into separate entities, and that politics is on its way to replacing instincts in the new Iraq, although this does not negate the legitimate fears of foreign parties seeking to consecrate their intervention in its affairs under the pretext of filling the “vacuum” that might result from the US's withdrawal.
