During the July 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon, the secretary general of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, responded to those who accused the party of provoking the war in the interest of the Iranian-Syrian axis. He asked, “Why don't we consider it an American-Israeli war to weaken the Syrian-Iranian axis and its allies?” All the evidence indicated at the time that Nasrallah's analysis of this war and its prelude was correct, and so was his analysis of the realities of the war's aftermath. This is regardless of whether his rivals at the time let the realities of their internal dispute with Hezbollah and the dispute with Syria to shape their analysis of the war. In truth, the administration of former US President George Bush and Israel wanted to escape from the quagmire that Washington and the Neoconservatives had found themselves in because of Iraq, by waging another war. At least, this was one of the reasons that prompted the US and Israel to engage in an adventure against Lebanon and Hezbollah, with the intention of weakening one of the Syrian-Iranian main “cards” in the region. This was part of the struggle that was then underway, following Washington's invasion of Iraq and its disappointment with the failure of the domino effect, which was supposed to lead to regime change all throughout the region. Most likely, in light of the talk that has prevailed in last months, and which is being heard in diplomatic offices and international closed-door meetings about Israel's threats of a war against Lebanon, its government and Hizbullah, the same basis for evaluating the likelihood of this supposedly imminent war still applies. The calculations here may rest on the American and Israeli need for an alternative war to one against Iran, in their confrontation with this country over its nuclear program and the extension of its regional influence. This would see Lebanon become a theater for this war, in view of the high cost of a catastrophic war against Iran. However, this alternative war appears to be unlikely, in the view of more than one local, regional and international player, along with Hezbollah. There are several reasons for this belief, such as the fact that Washington wants to preserve a minimum level of stability in the region, so that it can focus on imposing new sanctions on Tehran. Also, this war will not be a picnic; it will be very costly for Israel, based on what Nasrallah threatened while talking about the balance of terror that was engendered by his recent speech, and earlier positions, stemming from the readiness of Hizbullah's weapons and fighters. Moreover, Lebanon enjoys a united domestic stance in any confrontation with Israel, and this has been communicated by Prime Minister Saad Hariri to several international parties, who relayed to him their fears of possible Israeli adventurism. This unity also serves as a deterrent to an Israeli gamble on domestic division in Lebanon, as one of the objectives of a war. It is also certain that Nasrallah does not want this war. He certainly does not want to put himself in the position of repeating what he said after the July War: if we knew that capturing two Israeli soldiers would cause this reaction, we would not have carried it out. He realizes how hard Lebanon was hit, and how hard it could be hit in a new war. Nasrallah's rivals should realize that all of the party's advanced readiness since 2006 will in fact prevent this war, because the enemy can no longer carry out an aggression against Lebanon (and Syria) whenever it wishes. However, the regional climate, which Hezbollah previously cited in 2006, and which still exists when discussing war today, is not a sufficient reason for Nasrallah to reject the call by some to not give Israel a pretext to attack. If it is true that the regional situation surrounding the decision to go to war relieves Israel of these pretexts, this same situation means that a war is unconnected to the resistance's readiness to liberate the Shebaa Farms and elsewhere, just as the 2006 war was not a reaction to the resistance's capture of two Israeli soldiers, but involved something much bigger. It is an undeniable fact that Nasrallah received two clear and decisive messages in 2006, warning about giving Israel pretexts to launch a war. The same regional context, which assumes there will be a war, leads to the following: Nasrallah accused some people of calling for an Israeli war themselves, because they say the resistance's mere existence (with arms independent of the state) gives Israel pretext to launch a war. In fact, Nasrallah's accusation diminishes the regional dimension of this war. No one believes that Israel will launch a war based on a local call for a conflict, in light of the previous reading of the justifications for this war. This accusation, irrespective of its justifications, is a return to the rhetoric of accusing rivals of treason, to justify the party's move toward the domestic scene, against the backdrop of rising internal division in Lebanon. Does this accusation then, serve the current framework of national solidarity? Or is it a justification for those who oppose Hezbollah to ask, in return, about President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's comment that Israel is preparing for a war “in the spring or summer, but that the resistance and the region's states will defeat them.” Does this constitute a regional call for war?
