A feeling of frustration is being expressed within some Lebanese circles regarding the outcome of the five years since the March 14 Alliance was established. In fact, on the occasion of commemorating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri today, many expressed bitterness and discontent at the inability of this coalition to determine the political direction taken by the country, especially after winning the legislative elections for two successive terms, and what this means in terms of it enjoying the popularity necessary to do so. One can think of many reasons why the “Cedar Revolution” turned into a “deceived revolution”. But all of these reasons go back to factors external to the March 14 Alliance, especially Hezbollah and its political and military power extended from the Syrian-Iranian alliance. In fact, the formation of the March 14 Alliance came as a response to this power and to this alliance to which was once ascribed political responsibility for Hariri's assassination on the 14th of February 2005. In other words, the most prominent expression in the March 14 Alliance is that of the response to what has been referred to as the former Syrian-Lebanese security regime, and of the response to the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon and the support received by Hezbollah from Syria and Iran. And because it is a defensive reaction, this alliance was followed by a sectarian split in the country. It has failed, over the past five years, to record any breakthrough beyond its own public, and in fact has lost, after winning the latest elections, one of its pillars, Walid Jumblatt, which has made it clear that there is yet another type of defensive behavior that falls outside the scope of the March 14 Alliance and that the calculations of political positioning exceed the meaning of the hopes some have expected from this alliance. The words “state”, “constitution” and “justice” appear often in the statements and manifestoes of March 14 leaders, yet the experience of the past five years – with what they have involved in terms of dangerous events reaching state, constitution and independence – has not revealed the ability to provide a definition for these terms which would make them a popular drive that could attract people and thereby alter the internal balance of power. The latest elections came to make this alliance a tool for obtaining seats in the parliament, under an electoral law that drives towards sectarian cooperation, much more than it was an occasion to launch a general national campaign that would attract citizens to the hope of change that would affect their daily life. In fact, crushed by the financial crisis, the tension of political crises and the sterile debate over shares of power, and shocked at the size of administrative and political corruption, citizens find themselves disconnected from the meaning of nation, state and constitution, and instead become more and more connected to sectarian protection, since these terms mean nothing to them and have not given them any hope of change that would affect their lives or the political behavior of their leaders. In other words, the March 14 Alliance was formed in response to political circumstances, and was never a self-standing view built on the bitter experiences witnessed by Lebanon since the eruption of the civil war in 1975, nor a plan and a program of national integration and political and economic reform. This is why this alliance, despite the fact that it is theoretically leading the current government, was never able to resolve any of the country's urgent problems. Indeed, it is closer to the leadership of a caretaker government than to that of a government seeking to implement a national political and economic plan. Furthermore, this alliance's predicament is getting worse after the slogans that were behind its formation have ceased to be. In fact, such circumstantial slogans connected to the relationship with Syria are not the basis upon which a national plan can be established in the first place.
