Israel is worried since it never enjoyed periods of calm over the past two decades, as it did in 2009. This concern is growing since “Syria and Hezbollah and Hamas are piling up arms and missiles,” while Iran continues to deceive the West, and the United States in particular, with tactical maneuvers that conceal its efforts to complete its nuclear program, in addition to its dream to wipe off Israel. The Hebrew State is worried because it did not finish off Hamas and Hezbollah in two wars, during which it resorted to the weapons of mass destruction and random killing to impose an umbrella of terror on the region. Netanyahu and Barak are afraid that the attempts to stir up an inter-Palestinian conflict would come to an end, and that the pressing desires of Khalid Mashaal would be “abruptly” achieved by signing a reconciliation agreement with Mahmoud Abbas. Israel's concerns are further heightened since all the American pressures failed to make Abbas fall in the trap of accepting the resumption of negotiations before Netanyahu yields to the condition of ceasing the settlement activities. But the prime minister's inclination to link the cessation of settlement activities to an undetermined period – perhaps two months – started raising doubts over Israel's deceitful intentions to prepare a new round of conflicts among the Palestinians, one that would be sparked by making the Palestinians hold each other as traitors. This perhaps will not distance the West Bank from the “settling of scores” which Netanyahu wishes to be continued among the Palestinians, and by their own hands. But when the Israeli prime minister, his minister of defense, and army leaders repeat the talk about the “comprehensive war,” then the issue goes beyond the calculations of pushing the Palestinian track forward to show a premeditated response with the United States and the ambitions of President Barack Obama. When the first Barak, i.e. Ehud, recommends starting negotiations with Syria “as soon as possible,” he implies a deceitful desire to avoid the first option, so that Israel would not be forced to fight on the Iranian, Syrian, Hezbollah (Lebanon), and Hamas (Gaza) fronts. So do Syria and Iran really want a war? Tehran realizes that while it continues its “nuclear” achievements and reinforces its missile arsenal amid the ups and downs of the difficult dialogue with the West, it will not find better circumstances to monopolize what it deems the “deterrent power” in the Gulf. The menace of sanctions will be the new tool to renew the regime's unity in Tehran, and mobilize the [Iranian] street to face the “conspirators” at home with the “soft war.” The insistence on the “great revenge” in the event of an Israeli or American strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities does not cancel the reality that the first strike has a list of goals, after which it becomes difficult for the Islamic Republic to face any front, even if it were a “soft” one. Tehran does not want a war, as it seeks to fulfill its dream to be the regional “superpower,” and Israel of course fears the price of revenge, just as it seems impossible for it to coexist with a nuclear Iran. There is a big difference between Tehran and Damascus with which Ehud Barak insists to “end the state of enmity,” and wishes to resume negotiations; or else, the next confrontation will be of a “comprehensive” nature. He is neither warning his army's leaders nor Netanyahu, and is thus delivering a message of threat to Syria so the latter accepts to sit down to a table of negotiations, without an intermediary and without recalling “Rabin's deposit.” The same message justifies Ankara's fears which it conveyed to the region's counties, with it convinced that the war is unavoidably coming. Israel expands the circle of threats, as though provoking the quartet, i.e. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, to ignite a confrontation. Despite the conflicting motives, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim repeatedly warns against a “comprehensive war” and a war of cities if the confrontation breaks out. With the [Syrian] prime minister's description of the “role of hooligans” in Israel, a question should be raised about the purpose of the Hebrew State behind such a confrontation, while it seems very unlikely that Damascus or Tehran will fire the first shot. The same scenario applies to Hezbollah as well, as it continues to reiterate its adherence to Resolution 1701, or at least to the state of non-war, unless it wants to defend itself and the land. Hamas for its part is perhaps not very lucky in controlling the infiltrations, or preventing a Palestinian faction from slamming rockets at Israel, so the latter responds with a war. Therefore, what remains is the irresponsible possibility for Netanyahu to erase the catastrophe of the non-victory in the July war 2006, through pushing the confrontation to its end in order to dismantle the quartet alliance by the use of power, i.e. cutting what he deems to be supply routes for Hezbollah and luring Syria into engaging in the negotiations from another position. Would this be then the alternative solution for hitting the Iranian nuclear facilities, or a necessary scenario before reaching the Bushehr and Natanz [power plants]? Each confrontation has a price, one which Israel alone will of course not be able to determine.
